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INTRODUCTION
Early Sunday morning, March 3, 1991, after a car chase through
the Los Angeles freeways, police officers ordered Rodney King to
exit his car; King got out of the car and was ordered to lie down on
the ground.' A dozen officers soon surrounded him, and one,
Stacey Koon, fired two shots from his stun gun at King's chest,
without effect.2 Laurence Powell began to hit King repeatedly with
a night stick as others joined in. King then rose to his knees and
received ten quick baton blows.' As if to ward off the onslaught,
King raised his arm and then tumbled to the ground, falling on his
stomach.' In all, the officers hit the man at least forty times.5
On Wednesday, April 29, 1992, at the corner of Florence and
Normandie Avenues in downtown Los Angeles, rioters stopped an
eighteen-wheel truck and dragged its driver, Reginald Denny, out of
the cab. Using his right leg, Keith Watson forced Denny's face
down to the pavement as others beat him with a ball-peen hammer
and other objects. Then, Damian Williams, at a range of three feet,
threw a brick that smashed Denny's head. Williams then proceeded
to dance what appeared to be ajubilant jig and left Denny bleeding
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on the street. Later, Denny was rescued by a few brave local
residents.6
Few images have etched themselves onto the American psyche
as deeply as the videotapes of Rodney King's beating at the hands
of Los Angeles police officers and Reginald Denny's beating, live on
television, at the hands of the Los Angeles rioters. Significantly, the
judicial resolution of both these atrocious crimes turned on
questions of intent: Did Damian Williams intend to murder Denny
with his brick?7 Did officers Koon and Powell intend to violate
King's constitutional rights to be safe from the use of unreasonable
force and to be protected from harm while in official custody?
The central role of intent in these highly publicized trials led the
subsequent public discussion into some unusual debates on the
criminal law's intent requirement and, perhaps unknowingly, on
basic issues regarding the philosophy of mind: How does one know
what people are thinking or intending? What evidence can
reasonably count in such a determination? Although theoretical and
abstruse, these questions of determination often surfaced through-
out the public debate.
For instance, on the television program MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour,
lawyer Barry Levin said: "The intent required [is one of] premedi-
tated, willful, and deliberate ... first degree murder .... Mr.
Williams did not bring a weapon to the scene of the crime ....
There are many factors that go into the determination ... of
proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt."9 Professor Susan
Estrich responded: "But when you hit somebody with a brick on the
6 See Edward J. Boyer, TV Reporter Identfies Williams and Watson as Denny's
Attackers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1993, at BI (describing testimony furnished during the
trial of Williams and another accused of attacking Denny by a radio and television
reporter who broadcast live coverage of the L.A. riots); Marc Lacey & Shawn Hubler,
Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, A21 (describing the
"gruesome scene[]" as reported by the "TV news helicopters").
7 See Michael Hedges, L.A. Quiet After Verdicts: Denny Defendants Beat Serious
Charges, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at Al ("Los Angeles Superior CourtJudgeJohn
Ouderkirk ordered the jury to continue deliberations today on a charge that Williams
attempted to murder Mr. Denny, [a charge] which could carry a life prison term.").
' See William H. Freivogel, Civil Rights Charges Cary Heavy Burden: Old Law
Emphasizes 'Specific Intent' Rule, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 1993, at 1C.
Laurence M. Powell and Stacey C. Koon were convicted under criminal civil rights
provisions. See L.A. Police Sentences Explained, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 1993, at 18; see also
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (forbidding deprivation of civil rights under color of law "by
reason of [a person's] color, or race").
9 MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour: Verdict (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 20, 1993).
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head, you generally intend to do them harm." 10
In the pages of the Los Angeles Times, ProfessorJerome Skolnick
asked: "Could any juror, or any reader of this column, for that
matter, confidently conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Williams intended to put Denny to death or disfigure him with a
blow by a brick?"" George McCarty answered: "Given that
Williams deliberately, willfully and maliciously smashed Denny's
skull with that brick, could any fair, reasonable and rational person
conclude otherwise?" 2  As these two examples illustrate, an
inference of intent from a particular individual's behavior can be as
clear as day to some, but as cloudy as aJuneau afternoon to others.
Prosecutors used a variety of approaches to demonstrate to
jurors the intents within the defendants' minds. In the federal trial
of Rodney King, Barry Kowalski, who has "made a career of
decoding for juries the subtle clues of such intent," " advised the
prosecution to concentrate on the officers' lies, in order to suggest
that the police acted willfully and tried to cover it up. 4 Similarly,
in the Denny trial, Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Janet
Moore noted that she could not "'cut open Mr. Williams' head to
show you what he thinks.'"'" Instead, she asked the jurors to look
at circumstantial evidence like Williams's throwing, rather than
tossing, the brick.'6 Commenting on the trial, Professor Robert
Pugsley asked, "'How does one ever know what is in somebody's
head? ... It's rough justice .... It's all kind of a mind-reading
game that in no way can be seen as scientific, but it's the best we
got.'"
17
Obviously, something very odd is going on. Janet Moore
certainly cannot cut into people's brains to see the intentions
therein, but exactly how is throwing rather than tossing a brick
evidence of anything? Or, how is lying an indication of past
10 Id.
" Jerome H. Skolnick, Perspective on the Denny Verdicts: The People's July Did Its Job,
L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1993, at All.
12 George H. McCarty, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1993, at B7.
"3 Jim Newton, The Strategy, the Fights, the Setbacks-How Four Driven Men Tackled
One of the Most Explosive Criminal Trials of Modern Times, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1993,
(Magazine), at 11-12.
14 See id.
'" EdwardJ. Boyer & Ashley Dunn, Williams, Watson Meant to Kill Denny, Prosecutor
Says, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 1993, at Al, A13.
16 See id. at A13.
17 Ashley Dunn, Tough Law, Tough Cases, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at B1, B4.
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willfulness? If determining intent is like "a mind-reading game,"
what are the rules by which one plays?
While these highly controversial trials have focused national
attention on the intent issue, legislators have been writing new laws
that may ensure that the controversy surrounding intent stays on
the national stage. In particular, many states have begun to pass
hate-crimes statutes,'" and Congress is currently considering a
federal hate-crimes statute. 19 Moreover, Congress is also consider-
iig the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). ° As this Com-
ment will show, these laws require not only intent, which proved
problematic enough in the Williams trial, but motive as well.
Crimes of motive require more detailed findings of mental state and
a deeper inspection of human motivation than other intent crimes.
Therefore, the methods that juries use to determine intent under
these statutes are a central issue: How will courts determine
whether a particular word or gesture is indicative of intentional
selection as required by Wisconsin law to enhance the penalty for
hate-motivated crimes?2 ' How will a court under VAWA determine
18 For instance, California's state hate-crimes statute provides:
No person ... shall ... willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with,
oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him or her by the constitution or laws of
this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States because of the
other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability,
gender, or sexual orientation.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). For some other examples
of state hate-crimes statutes, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121(1) (Supp. 1993); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(a)58 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 470A (1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 22, § 16 (Law. Co-
op. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 240.30 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1985); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850 (West
Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.155(c) (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2710
(1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-3 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080
(West 1988 & Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (1992).
19 See Hate Crimes Sentencing Act, H.R. 1152, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
20 See H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., tits. 32-37 (1993), reprinted in 139 CONG.
REC. S17,095 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1993). The original bill was introduced onJune 19,
1990. See 136 CONG. REC. S8263 (daily ed.June 19, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden).
The most recent version of VAWA, H.R. 3355, supra, "An Act to amend the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968," is currently pending in Congress. In
this Comment, my discussion of VAWA specifically refers to the civil rights section
of this proposed act. See id. tit. 34.
2' See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West Supp. 1993) (enhancing criminal sentences
by a period of "not more than 5 years" for one who "[i]ntentionally selects the person
against whom the crime... is committed.., because of... the race, religion, color,
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whether a rape or other violent crime was committed or "motivated
by [the victim's] gender"22 when it can be so difficult to determine
whether a person who hurls a brick at Reginald Denny's head was
motivated by an intent to commit murder?
The criminal law's reliance on courts' abilities to read the minds
of defendants is basic to the criminal law.23 It would be difficult,
if not impossible, to imagine the criminal law without intent,
purpose, knowledge, willfulness, or recklessness-all psychological
qualities that require inquiry into the internal state of a defendant's
mind.24 Moreover, general intuition tells us that in many cases
reading other minds presents little difficulty. Few would consider
controversial the claim that when X smiles and extends his hand, he
wants to meet you. Life would be difficult without such knowledge
about other minds.
25
Yet just as common sense dictates that some internal mental
states are easily read, that same common sense similarly tells us that
other internal mental states are nearly impossible to read: What was
Hamlet thinking when he murdered Polonius as he cowered behind
a tapestry in Queen Gertrude's closet? Did Hamlet really intend to
stab a rat or was it part of Hamlet's ruse to make people think he
was mad? Was he perhaps unconsciously using Polonius as a symbol
for King Claudius and thus actually motivated by a longing for
revenge?2 As the jurors at the trial of Reginald Denny's attackers
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of the person"). The
Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute. See
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2202 (1993); see also infra part IV.D (analyzing
the Mitchell decision).
2 H.R. 3355, supra note 20, §§ 3402(b), (d)(1).
23 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962) (delineating the general requirements of
culpability).
24 Negligence is excluded, of course, because as usually understood by a formula-
tion of the reasonable person standard, negligence requires no inquiry into internal
mental states. This standard is determined and applied without reference to what the
actor was thinking at the moment. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 173-74 (5th ed. 1984).
25 See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Capacity, in ACTION AND VALUE IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW 239, 268 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) ("Relatively orderly and
predictable human interaction is possible only because we are all able within
reasonable limits to make inferences about our fellow humans' mental states from
behavior....").
26 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, sc. 4 (Yale Univ. Press, 1947). This
Comment will return several times to this moment in the play. In this scene, Hamlet
accuses his mother, Queen Gertrude, of gross impropriety for marrying his uncle
Claudius less than two months after her husband (Hamlet's father) was murdered by
Claudius-or so the ghost of Hamlet's father claims. The courtier, Polonius, hides
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discovered, troubling examples spring not only from literature.
This Comment looks to philosophy to see whether it provides
any guideposts to determine which types of mental states can be
inferred with confidence and which types cannot. Part I of the
Comment demonstrates, on philosophical grounds, the difficulty in
establishing certainty about internal mental states. The "other
minds" problem 7 is summarized, as is the problem's unsatisfactory
solution as forwarded by the philosophical behaviorists. Drawing on
Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel,28 Part I concludes that whatever
knowledge about internal mental states actually exists must be
derived by means of inference from behavior.
Part II of the Comment examines three ways to make such
inferences. The first strategy employs the argument from analogy,
which states that one can assume that others' minds work like one's
own. The second method of inference utilizes the evidence offered
by verbal utterances. It infers the intent present in the defendant's
mind from the words uttered by the defendant. The dispositive
nature of such evidence is questioned, and criteria for determining
the accuracy of such inferences is developed. The third inferential
method examines the evidence of the nature of the act itself. For
instance, the evidence that X answers the doorbell means he thought
there was a visitor at his doorstep. In Part III, the types of mental
states in which the law is interested are discussed.
After arguing that motives and intents are, in fact, different in
Part IV, the Comment shows in Part V how motive crimes push the
inferential strategies beyond a comfort level, beyond a point where
such inferences can be considered valid. To demonstrate this point,
motive crimes such as state hate-crimes statutes (of the sort recently
upheld in Wisconsin v. Mitchell2 9 ) and the proposed Violence
Against Women Act will be discussed.
behind an arris as he spies on Hamlet speaking to Queen Gertrude. When Hamlet
discovers this ruse, he stabs Polonius through the arris, crying "How now! a rat?
Dead, for a ducat, dead!" Id. at 108. To the delight of many a literature student,
Hamlet's mental state at the time of this murder is most speculative and provides
ample material for essay writing.
2'7 The other minds problem concerns determining whether other human beings
have minds or are, in fact, automata. In a more general sense, the other minds
problem questions the types of inferences-drawn from physical behavior-needed to
justify knowledge claimed about other minds. See PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, MATTER
AND CONSCIOUSNESS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
67-68 (1984).
2
8 See infra part I.B.
11 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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This Comment concludes that, as a jurisprudential matter, laws
which require determining intent and motivation to a high specifici-
ty present courts with decisions which cannot be made on a sound
basis. Such laws, of which VAWA and hate-crimes statutes are
particularly egregious examples, invite judges and juries to inject
their own beliefs into the evidentiary vacuum which the motive
requirements of these laws create. The imprecision of these laws
also opens the possibility of punishing thought. These laws,
therefore, threaten both the credibility and impartiality of the
courtroom as well as freedom of thought.
I. THE OTHER MINDS PROBLEM AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The jurors in the King and Denny trials were not the first to
encounter the difficulties and intractabilities of determining motive
and intent. In the nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes
articulated the theory that as law matures, liability-civil and
criminal-becomes more external and less reliant on mental state."0
Holmes stated that "commonly malice, intent, and negligence mean
only that the danger was manifest to a greater or less degree."
31
More recent theorists have echoed Holmes's call and have
sought to limit the role of subjective, internal mental states. George
Fletcher, in rejecting a more subjective, intention-based theory of
criminal law, states that "the ground of punishment . .. is some-
thing external that is attributed to the actor .... [T]his external
element ... should be manifested, externally."3 2 Fletcher defends
the necessity of an external act to criminality by stating one of this
Comment's central assertions: "[T]he requirement of manifestly
criminal conduct might be defended on evidentiary grounds ....
It is so difficult to discern the subjective state of intending."
33
Judge Richard Posner also has expressed discomfort with the
notion of intent. He, like Holmes, envisions changing the law's
intent requirements into terms of descriptions of external behavior,
thereby obviating references to internal mental states:
We [can] examine the circumstances of the crime .. . [and firom
these circumstances a model of a deliberating criminal could be
so See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 168 (1990) ("Holmes
believed ... that the role of mental states in law diminishes as law becomes more
sophisticated .... ").
S' Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 471 (1878).
32 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.64, at 470 (1978).
33 Id. at 472.
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construed-an "objective" reconstruction of the criminal's motiva-
tional experience .... It is thus possible ... to understand
premeditation in behavioral terms .... The persistence of
mentalist language in law may merely bespeak the cultural
conservatism of the legal enterprise
5 4
Why are all of these distinguished jurisprudes so disturbed by
the mentalistic language of the criminal law? Certainly, their
discomfort has much to do with the difficulties in knowing what is
going on in other minds. As Fletcher notes, "[it] is so difficult to
discern the subjective state of intending.""
The problem in determining what is in another's mind is a
perennial problem in philosophy, commonly called "the other minds
problem." The issue can be put in several ways, most notably: How
do we justify knowledge claims that other minds exist, or how do we
justify knowledge claims "about the feelings, intentions, and
cognitive style of other minds?" 6 Thus, the problem has two
formulations: How do we know other minds exist, and how do we
know what they are thinking?7 It is the latter problem which is of
greatest import to the law.
Intents, beliefs, and other mental states are by their nature
suspect classes because they are not physical entities, or at least
neurophysiological research has yet to describe them in physical
terms. Nobody has ever seen an intent or motive walk down the
street, yet one can claim that X had an intent to do Y. We speak
about intents, motives, and internal mental states, yet we have no
definite idea of what they are. What are these nonphysical entities
that we speak about so casually?
While the nature of intent and motives and their relation to the
physical world form the bread and butter of the philosophy of
34 POSNER, supra note 30, at 175-76.
35 FLETCHER, supra note 32, at 472.36 Thomas 0. Buford, Introduction to ESSAYS ON OTHER MINDS ix, ix (Thomas 0.
Buford ed., 1970) (emphasis omitted).
s7 See William Hasker, Theories, Analogies, and Criteria, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 242, 242
(1971). Hasker states:
The problem of other minds retains its place on the philosophical agenda,
not because of a lingering doubt that perhaps after all one is only carrying
on a monologue with a collection of automata, but because any theory of
knowledge which cannot explain how we can know that other people feel,
think and experience life subjectively is crucially deficient.
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mind"8 and date back at least to Descartes," the concern of the
other minds problem is epistemological: How can one know or on
what evidence can one justify knowledge about another's mind's
intents and beliefs? It is this concern which seems to motivate a
healthy portion of Holmes's, Fletcher's, and Posner's discomfort
with the law's requirement of mental state-a concern made urgent
by recent events like the Denny trial and the proliferation of hate-
crimes statutes.
A. The Other Minds Problem
Why is knowing other minds so difficult? After all, everyone in
everyday life presumes such knowledge: we know when others are
angry, when others are lying, when others intend to hurt us, and
when others love us. The problem, as many an unrequited,
mistaken lover can tell us, is that we are often wrong. These errors
are chronic because the method for inferring beliefs and intents in
other minds is inherently inaccurate. Knowledge about other minds
always involves inferences from and generalizations about people's
behavior, words, or attitudes. These inferences and generalizations
usually take the following form: X ogles Y, then Y infers that X
desires her sexually because, as a general rule, people who ogle are
sexually desirous. The other minds problem, however, asks
how can one be justified in believing that the relevant psycho-
behavioral generalizations [in our example that people who ogle
are generally sexually desirous] are true of other creatures, when
all one can ever observe is one-half of the alleged connection: the
creature's behavior [for example, the ogle]? The creature's mental
states [for example, the internal, subjective mental state of being
desirous] are directly observable only by the creature himself.40
This problem has been expressed in several propositions of the
"other minds skeptic" who concludes that knowledge about other
minds is impossible.4 First, mental events, like seeing red, tasting
sacher torte, or desiring to kill one's law professor, are only fully
experienced by the conscious subject who is seeing red, eating a
's SeeJohn D. Greenwood, Introduction: Folk Psychology and Scientic Psychology, in
THE FUTURE oF FOLK PSYCHOLoGY: INTENTIONALITY AND COGNITIvE SCIENCE 1, 4
(John D. Greenwood ed., 1991) ("Contemporary philosophy of mind has moved...
[its interest] to intentional psychological phenomena such as beliefs and desires etc.").
S9 See CHURCHLAND, supra note 27, at 8.
4 0 Id. at 68 (emphasis omitted).
41 See Buford, supra note 36, at x-xv.
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sacher torte, or harboring murderous desires. As we all know,
watching someone eat a sacher torte is not the same as eating it.
Second, mental events exist only when and only because "an
individual mind has them;"4 2 the phrase esse est percipi4s applies to
mental events. One is hard pressed to describe what constitutes the
experience of seeing red or tasting a sacher torte without some
conscious being or entity actually doing the seeing or tasting.
Third, "[m]ental events and physical behavior are contingently
related."4 4 This means that a headache does not automatically
produce certain behaviors. There is no logical rule to conclude that
the afflicted individual will clutch his head and moan, and there is
no causal law which would require headache sufferers to clutch and
moan. While relationships between certain mental states and
certain behaviors no doubt exist (for example, happy people often
smile, excited people often jump up and down, sexually intrigued
people often ogle), there is no logical or causal law which mandates
these relationships. This is intuitively obvious, for happy people do
not always smile, excited people sometimes refrain from jumping up
and down, and some sexually intrigued people do not ogle.
This proposition nonetheless is of great significance. We have
no reliable method for inferring another person's internal mental
state from his overt physical behavior. The Model Penal Code,
however, assumes that we have that ability: it requires findings of
mental states.45 Common sense indicates that we can infer each
others' intents, subjective thoughts, and beliefs. Living in the world
would be quite difficult if we did not have at least some knowledge
of what was going on in other minds.46 There is evidence that
even monkeys presume the existence of intents and beliefs in other
monkeys. 47 Thus, intentionality may not be the hallmark of human
beings. Nonetheless, this knowledge is built on shaky principles.
There are two central conclusions to this discussion. First, one
has no direct empirical or physical evidence and thus no direct
42 Id. at xi.
4 "To be is to be perceived."
4' Buford, supra note 36, at xi.
45 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (delineating the general requirements of
culpability).
41 Imagine a world where you could not believe with certainty that your girlfriend
or boyfriend loved you, where you could never conclude that another was angry at
you, or where you could not conclude that a wave and smile meant your greeter was
happy to see you. The other minds skeptic denies these types of knowledge.47 See DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 238-39 (1990).
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knowledge of others' internal mental experiences; there is no
accurate way, moreover, to infer such knowledge. (And even if such
an inferential method were proposed, there would be no way to
verify it.) Second, the criminal law and the Model Penal Code
require such knowledge.
The following Sections present two responses to the other minds
problem-solutions which would redescribe the mentalistic language
of the Model Penal Code into verifiable physical phenomena. The
first response seeks to describe internal mental states in terms of
physical behavior similar to the program which Holmes and Posner
suggest for the law. 8 The second solution, which is suggested by
Posner's remarks on the outdated metaphysics of the law,49 seeks to
abolish the notion of mental states altogether. The failure of these
two solutions suggests the continuing endurance of mentalistic
language in the criminal law and the continuing need to check the
validity of the inferences used to determine mental state.
B. Philosophical Behaviorism's Answer to the Other Minds Problem
In the 1930s and 1940s, Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel
articulated the classic statements of philosophical behaviorism. 0
Although not widely accepted today,5' physical behaviorism-or
rather physical behavioristic approaches-have been popular among
influential American legal theorists. 2 Moreover, the tenets of
physical behaviorism, which emphasize observable phenomena,
underscore the assertion made in the previous Section" that
physical, observable behavior should serve as the basis for our
judgments about internal mental states. Philosophical behaviorists
think there is nothing meaningful to be stated beyond verifiable
physical behavior.5 4 Thus, those who believe that statements about
48 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
' See generally Rudolf Carnap, Psychology in Physical Language, in LOGICAL
POsmVISM 165 (A.J. Ayer ed. & George Schick trans., 1959); Carl G. Hempel, The
Logical Analysis of Psychology, in 1 READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY 14 (Ned
Block ed., 1980).
51 In the words of Stephen Stich, philosophical behaviorism has suffered "the
death of a thousand failures." STEPHEN STICH, FROM FOLK PSYCHOLOGY TO
COCNrrivE SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST BELIEF 14 (1983).
52 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
's See supra part I.A.
5 See Hempel, supra note 50, at 17 ("[A] statement for which one can indicate
absolutely no conditions which would verify it, which is in principle incapable of
confrontation with test conditions, is wholly devoid of content and without
20811994]
2082 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 2071
internal mental states are meaningful must recognize that their
statements require inferences above and beyond mere empirical
data.
1. Statements About Internal Mental States,
Which Are Nonphysical and Thus
Unverifiable, Are Meaningless
Carnap defines what he terms the "physical language" as the
verifiable statements about the external world.5 Carnap further
asserts that any meaningful law of psychology must be "translatable
into physical language."5" Being a logical positivist, Carnap would
consider only phenomena which are physically observable as truly
verifiable phenomena. Those sentences which refer to nonphysical
entities or to other sentences which, in turn, do not refer to physical
phenomena are unverifiable and thus meaningless.
5 7
Therefore, statements about beliefs, intents, or any internal
mental state would be meaningless, because they would be inex-
pressible in the physical language. 8 The statement "I am jealous"
is, given the state of neurophysiological knowledge, irreducible to
statements about the physical world. One cannot point to a
particular configuration of neurons and say that it constituted
jealousy. In everyday life and language, jealousy will always be
referred to in subjective terms and perhaps for philosophical
reasons never can be reduced to a particular neurological state.
5 9
The problem with supposing internal mental states is that one
must presuppose something beyond the verifiable (or at least the
potentially verifiable, using an incredibly developed neurophysiolog-
ical imaging apparatus) physical arrangement of neurons, such as
the internal sensation of jealousy or the intent to smash someone's
head with a brick. Carnap points out that these internal, mental
experiences are nonphysical and doubts whether sentences uttered
meaning.").
55 Carnap, supra note 50, at 166.
5Id. at 167.
'7 See id. at 180 (stating that a sentence is not "rendered meaningful by the fact"
that it came from one's mouth).
' Carnap rejects the claims ofphenomenology that psychological qualities can be
known a priori or "on the basis of some single illustrative case." Id. at 168.
" See CHURCHLAND, supra note 27, at 26 ("At present we do not know enough
about the intricate functionings of the brain actually to state the relevant identities
[between internal mental states like jealousy and their characteristic neurological
substrate].").
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about them can be verified.6" He promptly labels these sentences
"meaningless" and consigns them to the realm of the metaphysical
"pseudo-sentence. "61
2. The Identification of Statements of Behavior with
Statements About Internal Mental States
Carnap, however, does not despair of ever forming sentences
about internal mental states of other minds. Instead, he denies that
they are separate from physical behaviors and identifies internal
mental states with physical behaviors themselves. 62 Thus, when
one says, "I am tired," what one really means is "I am displaying
tired behavior."
Adopting such a view about internal mental states has obvious
advantages to the law: jurors would no longer have to peer into
subjective mental state-instead, they would merely observe
behavior. Unlike internal mental states, behavior is public,
unsubjective, and readily observable. By identifying internal mental
states with behavior, one completely obviates the other minds
problem. It comes as no surprise that commentators from Holmes
onward have advocated approaches to mental state which could
fairly be called behavioristic.
63
3. The Failures of Philosophical Behaviorism
By defining internal mental states as behavior, philosophical
behaviorism fails to grasp the essential nature of experience: If X
suffers pain stoically so that no one but he knows he experiences
pain, is X experiencing pain? Since the philosophical behaviorist is
committed to defining pain as a behavior and X is displaying no
pain behavior, X is not, by the philosophical behaviorist definition,
in pain. In the end, the philosophical behaviorist's definition of
mental states collapses into circularity: philosophical behaviorism
seems merely to describe internal mental states in a term (behavior)
which does not have much to do with internal state.
Another problem of philosophical behaviorism emerges from
the justification of knowledge about one's own subjective mental
states. How does X know that he is angry? Following philosophical
I See Carnap, supra note 50, at 176.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 170.
' See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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behaviorism, X must observe his own behavior and cannot rely on
his own, internal feeling of being angry." This leads to the very
odd conclusion that one cannot determine one's own mental state
by introspectively asking oneself how one feels; one would have to
observe one's own behavior. Thus, I would not be angry simply
because I felt angry; I would be angry only if I displayed angry
behavior.
Finally, philosophical behaviorism has problems handling mental
states which ordinarily do not have any characteristic outward signs.
Take, for instance, the problem of the mental state of "earnestly
wants a cucumber sandwich." The philosophical behaviorists try to
solve this problem by understanding such mental states as multi-
tracked dispositions.6 5 One has the disposition "wants a cucumber
sandwich" if (1) one would say "yes" to a waitress serving them, and
(2) one would make them rather than peanut butter and jelly, and
(3) one salivates when one sees them, and so forth."6 The problem
is that defining the mental state "wants a cucumber sandwich" in
terms of all its conditionals creates an infinitely long definition.
6 7
Dispositional states, therefore, cannot be clearly and definitely
stated, for their definitions contain potentially infinite elements.
Therefore, the concreteness and clarity which the philosophical
behaviorists gain by equating mental state with behavior or
disposition disappears and is replaced by the inevitably vague and
open-ended definitions of dispositional states.
In sum, philosophical behaviorism's circularity does not really
say anything about mental state.68 Overt behavior or dispositions
have no law-like or logical relationship to mental state. To say pain
is a certain type of behavior simply defines pain in a certain way,
nothing more: "[f]rom the statement 'X has a pain' by itself no
behavioral statement follows-not even a behavioral statement with
a 'normally' or a 'probably' in it."69 The subjective sensation of
64 See generally Paul Ziff, About Behaviorism, in ESSAYS ON OTHER MINDS, supra note
36, at 111. Ziff introduces this problem of philosophical behaviorism with the once
famous joke of the two philosophical behaviorists who meet in the street. As a
greeting, one says to the other, "You feel fine! How do I feel?" Id. at 111. Ziff,
however, feels that both the objection to philosophical behaviorism and the joke are
"bad." Id.65 See CHURCHLAND, supra note 27, at 23.
6 See id.
67 See id. at 25.
6 See Hilary Putnam, Brains and Behavior, in 1 READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY OF
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 50, at 24, 35.
69 Id. at 30.
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pain and pain behavior are different phenomena; one simply cannot
define the former in terms of the latter without creating a circular,
empty definition.
C. Eliminative Materialism
Another response to the other minds problem is simply to deny
the existence of internal mental states or their effectiveness in
controlling behavior.7" Like B.F. Skinner,71 the eliminative mate-
rialists understand human behavior without internal mental
states.7 2 They deny the "substantial set of laws or general state-
" See William Ramsey et al., Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk
Psychology, in THE FUTURE OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 38, at 93, 99.
71 See Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and the
Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1993) (discussing Skinner's rejection of
mentalistic approaches).
7 Much of the eliminative materialists' writing has decried folk psychology (the
notion that intents and beliefs exist and cause human behavior) simply because it
dates back to Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO
ARISTOTLE 308,478 (Richard McKeon ed. & W.D. Ross trans., 1947). Folk psychology
is therefore suspect and should be abandoned-just as Aristotelian physics has been
abandoned. See generally Paul M. Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the
Propositional Attitudes, 78J. PHIL. 67 (1981). The eliminative materialists, however,
are not the first to decry traditional psychological metaphysics. They follow in a long
tradition which includes, in this century, B.F. Skinner. See CHURCHLAND, supra note
27, at 90; Ramsey et al., supra note 70, at 95. Proponents of eliminative materialism
clearly suggest that they are, at least in a general sense, following in his footsteps. See
CHURCHLAND, supra note 27, at 91.
Dislike of traditional psychological metaphysics has a distinguished history,
extending as far back as Thomas Hobbes. "[F]or Hobbes mechanistic determinism
has the last word, in the human as in the non-human sphere." 5 FREDERICK
COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23 (1961). I would, however, offer instead
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, an author less well-known to the English-reading audi-
ence, as a grandfather of eliminative materialism. In his great work Man a Machine,
which was aimed against the Cartesian concept of mind, he presents a mechanical
view of man which, like the eliminative materialists, does not assert the existence of
intent or belief-only mechanism. See JULIEN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE, MAN A
MACHINE 4, 10 (Gertrude C. Bussey et al. trans., Open Court Publishing, 1927)
(1748). Interestingly, this work had a great influence on the Marquis de Sade. In the
middle of Philosophy in the Bedroom, in between performing unspeakable acts of sexual
perversion upon each other, the debauchees often discourse a philosophy remarkably
similar to modern ethological theories of behavior, which, like eliminative material-
ism, do not posit the existence of intents and beliefs. See MARQUIS DE SADE,
Philosophy in the Bedroom, in JUSTINE, PHILOSOPHY IN THE BEDROOM, AND OTHER
WRITINGS 179, 360-61 (Richard Seaver & Austryn Wainhouse eds. & trans., Grove
Weidenfeld 1965) (1795) ("Then act, Chevalier ... were we to pulverize this whore,
there'd not be a suspicion of crime in the thing: it is impossible for man to commit
crime; when Nature inculcated in him the irresistible desire to commit crime ....
[We are but t]he blind instruments of her inspirations, were she to order us to set fire
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ments connecting the various mental states with (1) other mental
states, with (2) external circumstances, and with (3) overt behav-
iors. " 7' Relying on advances in artificial intelligence, computer
science, and cognitive science, the eliminative materialists deny the
causal role of intents and beliefs in human behavior.7 4 Several
models have been advanced to replace the semantic, propositional
nature of traditional psychological paradigms. 75  These models
deny the causal efficacy of internal mental states like belief, intent,
and desire and thus suggest ways complex, essentially nonphysical
mentalistic experience can be reconciled with a universe ruled by
material determinism. 76  The eliminative materialists' claims are
controversial and are still in their infancy; they by no means have
won universal acceptance. 77 If the eliminative materialist project
is successful in describing and predicting human behavior in
physical rather than in mental terms, the impact on the criminal law
could be considerable.
78
Ii. THE OTHER MINDS PROBLEM, PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIORISM,
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM, AND THE INEVITABILITY
OF INFERRING INTERNAL MENTAL STATES
Until (or if) eliminative materialism establishes the truth of its
positions (dare we say "beliefs"), the criminal law will continue to
utilize intents and beliefs; the Model Penal Code cannot do without
them.79 Moreover, the physical behaviorist method of equating
to the universe. . .).
73 CHURCHLAND, supra note 27, at 58.
a For a searching analysis of eliminative materialism and its relationship to the
law, see generally Lelling, supra note 71.
' See Ramsey et al., supra note 70, at 93. Ramsey describes a network where
numerous input nodes connect to form an output node. Sixteen propositions were
assigned specific numerical values for the input nodes. By weighting the intermediate
nodes with appropriate values, the network was "trained-up" so that it gave values of
one or near one for the true propositions, and zero or near zero for the false proposi-
tions. Thus, the network mimics semantic reasoning without ever possessing semantic
representations. See id. at 106-10.
76 See id.
77 For a recent critique of materialist, computer-inspired approaches to
understanding human mental functioning, see JOHN SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF
THE MIND (1993).
78 Lelling has proposed two alternatives, the "character theory" and economics-
based theories, to replace the criminal law's mental state psychology. See Lelling,
supra note 71, at 1531-36.
79 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (defining purpose, intent, and knowledge, which
are all discrete, folk psychological mental states of the type which eliminative
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internal mental state with behavior has long been abandoned; thus,
an analysis of mere behavior cannot yield knowledge about the
mental states required by the law. This is a quandary: the criminal
law requires knowledge about distinct mental entities which are not
completely revealed in mere physical behavior, yet human beings
have access only to mere physical behavior.
8 0
We are thus inexorably led to the notion that whatever can be
said about mental states must be inferred from behavior. Cast in a
particularly unattractive philosophical behaviorist/eliminative
materialist light, these inferences involve unverifiable and therefore
meaningless statements about nonexistent, or at least epiphen-
omenal, entities.8 1  Whatever one's metaphysics, one is still left
with the disjunction between behavior and mental states. Quine
notes:
A mental state is not always manifested in behavior.... Thus the
net result. . . is that the behavior provides incomplete and sporad-
ic symptoms whereby to identify and distinguish various complex
states of nerves ....
Mental states ... are like diseases. A disease may be diag-
nosed in the light of observable signs though the guilty germ be
still unknown .... 82
If one assumes that beliefs and intents have some sort of
existence and causal efficacy, then one is still left with the infer-
ence. 3 On what basis do we infer mental states, or, to use Quine's
language, what are the bases for the diagnoses of "incomplete and
sporadic symptoms" of mental states? This is the vital question.
Like philosophical behaviorists, jurors have only behavior with
which to judge internal mental states. They must use their
materialism disparages).
' With the possible exception of telepathics and other psychics, human beings
cannot, of course, read or know others' minds.
8" The eliminative materialist need not deny the subject's experience of believing
or intending. He merely claims that these internal mental states do not actually cause
action. They are side effects of the neural networks which actually cause action. See
Ramsey et al., supra note 70, at 96.
82 W.V. Quine, States of Mind, 82J. PHIL. 5, 6 (1985).
' Russell puts the point well:
It is probably possible theoretically to account for the behavior of living
bodies by purely physical causal laws [as the behaviorists and eliminative
materialists attempt to] .... If we are to believe that there are thoughts
and feelings other than our own, that must be in virtue of some inference
•.. [which] must go beyond what is needed in physics.
Bertrand Russell, Analogy, in ESSAYS ON OTHER MINDS, supra note 36, at 3, 6.
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empirical evidence to infer into the unverifiable world of intent,
belief, and purpose. The next Section will examine three possible
inferential methods: inferences from analogy from one's own mind,
inferences from words spoken by the actor, and inferences from an
analysis of an act's function.
A. The Argument from Analogy's Approach to Inferring
the Content of Internal Mental States
"The argument from analogy is the oldest of other minds
arguments against skepticism [that other minds are unknowable to
us]." 4 Certainly, it has an exalted pedigree which includes John
Stuart Mill85 and Bertrand Russell.86 The argument from analogy
asserts the proposition that minds are knowable even though one
does not sense the mind's sensations and thoughts.8 7 AJ. Ayer
provides a succinct statement of the argument:
On the basis of my own experience I form a general hypothesis to
the effect that certain physical phenomena are accompanied by
certain feelings. When I observe that some other person is in the
appropriate physical state, I am thereby enabled to infer that he
is having these feelings; feelings which are similar to those that in
similar circumstances I have myself.8 8
In general, this is the commonsense approach to the problem.
One knows other minds largely because they must function as one's
own. Russell wryly notes:
A philosopher might pretend to think that he knew only [a mind's
physical, rather than semantic structure], but let him get cross with
his wife and you will see that he does not regard her as a mere
spatio-temporal edifice .... We are therefore justified in inferring
that his skepticism is professional rather than sincere.
8 9
Russell provides a clear rebuttal of this "professional skepticism."
' Buford, supra note 36, at xi.
8 See JOHN S. MILL, AN EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY
23 (4th ed. 1872) (stating that the mind "is to us unknowable").
' See Russell, supra note 83, at 3-8 (stating that our knowledge of others' thoughts
and feelings is doubtful).
87 See id. at 3.
" Alvin Plantinga, Induction and Other Minds, in ESSAYS ON OTHER MINDS, supra
note 36, at 23, 23 (quoting A.J. AVER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 249 (1956)).
8' Russell, supra note 83, at 3.
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Yet it should be noted that Russell's main concern is justifying our
beliefs about other minds' existence, not our beliefs about other
minds' beliefs and intents. The argument easily lends itself to such
an extension, as the quotation from Ayer indicates. In other words,
one can justify knowledge about other minds in the same way that
one justifies the belief that other minds exist.
1. Russell's Argument from Analogy
Russell states that "[t]he behavior of other people is in many
ways analogous to our own, and we suppose that it must have
analogous causes. What people say is what we should say if we had
certain thoughts, and so we infer that they probably have these
thoughts."90 Thus, in everyday life, in the commonsense philoso-
phy, we assume that the human bodies around us, which look like
us and act like us, in fact have similar internal mental reactions to
things, even though we do not observe their internal mental
functioning.
Russell perceives that the primary threat to the soundness of this
inference is the possibility of "ingenious automata." 91 Ingenious
automata are mechanisms that mimic the behavior of thinking
beings but are merely programmed machines or glorified calcula-
tors. Everyone else might be ingenious androids who seem to think
and have internal mental reactions, but they are merely machines
whose behavior is not governed by thought and mind but by
physical mechanisms. Russell concludes, however, that there is a
high probability that other minds exist. This probability increases
as another person's observed behavior becomes more complex so
that it can best be explained by assuming the existence of other
minds. Russell states his conclusion in the following postulate:
If, whenever we can observe whether A and B are present or
absent, we find that every case of B has an A as a causal anteced-
ent, then it is probable that most B's have A's as causal anteced-
ents, even in cases where observation does not enable us to know
whether A is present or not.
92
90 Id. at4.
9' Id. at 5.
' Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
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2. A Few Objections to the Argument from Analogy
The philosophical behaviorists object to Russell's conclusion
because it claims knowledge not based on observable phenomena.
If it cannot be verified, it is meaningless." Currently, this ap-
proach is not taken too seriously,9 4 but its import for the law, I
would maintain, still remains significant. Courts should require
evidence to be fair by using methods that most citizens understand
and accept. Placing a premium on observable, verifiable evidence
is a good way for courts to fulfill that charge. The analogy
argument inevitably leads the juror or judge to make the unverifi-
able assertion that the accused's mind works (or would work) as his
own in a given situation. The accused's mind may work in a similar
way-or it may not; one can never verify one's hunch on the
matter.
95
A second, more sophisticated objection emerges when one
asserts, using the analogy argument, that two minds have the same
thought or sensation.9" Suppose that "she has a pain" means that
she has the same internal mental reaction or sensation as when I
have a pain. By what criteria can one establish sameness? How
does one tell that my internal mental reaction or sensations are the
same as yours? This problem can best be demonstrated by using
Russell's own postulate. Russell claims that if we observe in
ourselves a causal relation between a stimulus and a certain mental
state (for example, if I eat a sacher torte, then I have an internal
sensation of eating a sacher torte which I identify with almond crust
and raspberry jam), then the same relationship will probably hold
for other similar minds97 (for example, both you and I will react
with the same or similar mental state when eating a sacher torte).
But what does it mean to have two similar "sacher torte internal
mental states"? What criteria would one use to determine the
difference?
s See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
See supra part I.B.3.
For a rejection of the argument from analogy in the judicial process, see Kevin
L. Keeler, Comment, Direct Evidence of State of Mind: A Philosophical Analysis of How
Facts in Evidence Support Conclusions Regarding Mental State, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 435,
438-49. Instead of the argument from analogy, Keeler suggests a behaviorist
approach similar to the one outlined earlier in this Comment. See supra part I.B.
" See Norman Malcolm, Knowledge of Other Minds, in ESSAYS ON OTHER MINDS,
supra note 36, at 195, 197.
" See supra part II.A.1.
MOTIVE CRIMES AND OTHER MINDS
The philosophical behaviorists solve this problem by simply
adopting behavior as the criterion for determining similar mental
states: the same mental state is the same type of behavior.98 They,
therefore, have no need for the analogical argument. On the other
hand, the analogical argument does not have a criterion for
determining what is sameness.99 How can one determine whether
my sensation in my mind is the same as your sensation in your
mind? Certainly, one has a criterion for sameness in shape (all
squares have four sides arranged at right angles) and in sound (the
same decibel level and digital characterization). But how does one
establish the same mental state?100
Moreover, the argument from analogy requires an induction
from one case, that is, what is going in the analogizer's mind. This
is the weakest type of induction, "comparable to inferring that all
bears are white on the strength of observing a single bear (a polar
bear)."10t
3. A Final Argument Against Analogy
There is a final problem in the argument from analogy, namely
"that one learns from one's own case what thinking, feeling, [and]
sensation are."102 Russell makes this assumption: "We observe in
ourselves such occurrences as remembering, reasoning, feeling
pleasure, and feeling pain. We think that sticks and stones do not
See supra part I.B.2.
See Malcolm, supra note 96, at 197 ("If I do not know how to establish that
someone has a pain then I do not know how to establish that he has the same as I
have when I have a pain."). Here Malcolm employs the criteriological definition of
meaning which states that "[the] observable characteristics by which one identifies an
object as an instance of some descriptive expression are.. . 'criteria.'" Carl Wellman,
Wittgenstein's Conception of a Criterion, in WITrGENSTEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF OTHER
MINDS 154, 157 (Harold Morick ed., 1981). Thus, there are no sure criteria for the
application of a word which refers to intent, belief, or any other feature in the
mentalistic language, for one cannot find observable characteristics which could
establish "sameness."
'0o See Malcolm, supra note 96, at 195. This idea can be further elucidated by
distinguishing between a symptom and a criterion: "Criteria are observable features
which are directly connected to an expression by its meaning, symptoms are features
which are indirectly connected to the expression by being associated with the criteria
in our experience." Wellman, supra note 99, at 159. In a way, mental states have no
criteria; they only have symptoms. For similar comments on symptoms and mental
states, see generally Quine, supra note 82.
101 CHURCHLAND, supra note 27, at 69.
10 Malcolm, supra note 96, at 202 (emphasis omitted).
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have these experiences, but that other people do."'08 He would
assert that our own experiences teach us what the pleasure or pain
of any particular sensation is.
Drawing on Wittgenstein, Malcolm rejects this assertion.
Following Russell-and the commonsense approach-one learns what
pain is from one's own inward experience of pain. One learns what
pleasure is from experiencing the eating of a sacher torte. Yet how
does one know that one is right? One could be identifying pleasure
with pain and vice-versa: "Suppose that [one] identified the
emotion of anxiety as the sensation of pain? Neither he nor anyone
else could know about this 'mistake.'... The inward identification
cannot hit the bull's-eye, or miss it either, because there is no bull's-
eye."
104
Thus, the argument from analogy hardly gets off the ground
because one really cannot be confident that one is properly
identifying those mental properties-in one's own mind-which one
is analogizing into another's.
4. The Analogical Argument and the Law
The main point of the preceding discussion is that the common-
sense approach that one can somehow project his own mind onto
the mind of another is suspect. Nevertheless, it is the way most of
us, including judges and juries, infer the intent of others' behavior
and words.
10 5
There are several limitations to the analogy argument which
bear particularly on legal settings. First, by its own premises, the
analogical argument requires that the mind-bearing entities be
similarly constituted. It makes sense to assume that one mind works
like another only if both are similar in physical structure. A
presumes B's mind works like his own at least partly because A and
B resemble each other physically, that is, both are members of the
human species, and similar physical structures tend to work
similarly.10 6 Thus, the accuracy of the analogy depends on the
degree of similarity between the two minds because one would
expect that just as physically similar objects act similarly, physically
103 Russell, supra note 83, at 4.
104 Malcolm, supra note 96, at 204.
0 See Keeler, supra note 95, at 435.
Russell is explicit about this point. "I infer that other people's bodies are
associated with minds, which resemble mine in proportion as their bodily behavior
resembles my own." Russell, supra note 83, at 7.
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dissimilar objects act dissimilarly. Strictly applying this logic, one
might conclude that minds which share similar histories, experi-
ences, and backgrounds make the best judgments and determina-
tions about each other's mental state. Common sense bears this
out: spouses and family members who have spent their lives
together often have uncanny abilities to read each other's minds.
Complete strangers have greater difficulty reading each other's
minds.
Second, the argument from analogy, if taken to its extreme,
would reasonably allow one to ascribe to other minds "only what
one finds in one's own mind."'07 This limitation would exclude
colorblind people from "believ[ing] that other humans have visual
sensations. " "' A colorblind person cannot analogize the internal
mental state of seeing blue if he has never had the internal mental
state of seeing blue.
Thus, the argument from analogy seems perfectly acceptable for
the judging of common experiences we all share but perhaps less
suitable for more complex experiences. One could use the analogy
argument to be confident that one's girlfriend is more than a
mechanized doll, but not necessarily to infer what Hamlet'0 9 was
thinking when he stabbed Polonius."0 Why? Because while we all
share general mental states like consciousness, hunger, pain, or
jealousy, we do not all share more complex states, like those of a
disinherited, cerebral, and overweight Danish prince who communi-
cates with dead relatives, suffers Oedipal tensions, and is planning
to skewer the father of his beloved Ophelia. Like the above
argument about colorblindness, one can analogize only those
sensations and mental states which one experiences. Almost all of
us experience sight, hearing, and smell. One can, therefore,
conclude that other minds see, hear, and smell as one's own. We
all do not share, however, Hamlet's angst; analogizing our minds
onto his mind is, therefore, of limited value.
The most disturbing upshot is that jurors who are more similar
to the defendant can best make judgments about his mental state.
One might conclude that only female jurors can best determine




"0 Like Prufrock, "I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be." T.S. ELIOT, The
Love Song ofJ. Alfred Prufrock, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1935, at 16 (1936).
"' See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 26, act 3, sc. 4.
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determine the mental states of other wealthy WASPs, and so forth.
In short, the greater the difference in the experiences of the
accused and the jurors, the less qualified they are to determine the
accused's mental states. This last problem demonstrates that
analogy serves as an incomplete inferential strategy for the law.
B. Quine's Funny Bunny: Inferring Internal Mental
State Through Verbal Evidence
Another way to infer the mental states of others is through
verbal evidence. Common sense would say that one who exclaims
"I'm going to kill that man" and then reaches for his revolver
generally has the internal mental state of intending to kill. Using
verbal evidence to determine internal mental state, however, is not
simple because a speaker's intent regarding the meaning of a word
he utters is often indeterminate. Moreover, even if one determines
a speaker's intended meaning, this does not prove motivation-as
VAWA and hate-crimes legislation require. An attacker may mean
by his utterance "I hate you because you belong to a certain group."
Such a statement might support the inference that the speaker is
racist, but that does not mean that the particular attack is motivated
by his hate."'
This problem is evident in determining the meaning of hateful
epithets. The legislative history of VAWA 1 2 and judicial decisions
on hate crimes" 3 show the importance of epithets in determining
intent. The burden of this Section will be to show the difficulties
of demonstrating what any word-and especially an epithet-means
1 Wigmore is quite explicit on this point. "Since the Intention, offered to
evidence an Act, becomes in its turn an interim probandum, there is thus always a
double inference involved, first from the conduct, etc. to the intention, and then from
the intention to the act." JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OFJUDICIAL PROOF § 102
(3d ed. 1937).
With language, there is a triple inference to determine mental state. As will be
shown in the following test, one must first determine the meaning of an utterance or
epithet, then infer a mental state of hate from the utterance, and, finally, use the
inferred mental state of hate to prove circumstantially that the same mental state of
hate actually caused the criminal act.
12 See S. REP. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1991) (stating that one of three
proofs of gender motivation would be uttering "antiwomen epithets," just as racial
epithets are used to show civil rights violations of racially motivated attacks). This
idea was expressed again in the report accompanying the 1993 version of VAWA. See
S. REP. NO. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1993).
113 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Rink, 574 A.2d 1078, 1081 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
("We are not persuaded by appellant's rationalization that the ethnic epithets were
not racially motivated but were the result of emotionally charged behavior.").
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to the speaker. Since hate crimes (and perhaps VAWA) have intent
requirements, one must determine not what an epithet means, but
what the defendant meant by the epithet. Moreover, even if one
establishes what the speaker meant by the epithet, such knowledge
does not establish whether the speaker was motivated by hate or
antiwoman bias, a requirement of many of the hate-crimes stat-
utesn1 4 and VAWA. 115 A bigot can commit an act because he is
a bigot-or for other reasons. That he expresses that he is a bigot
before committing a crime is merely circumstantial evidence that his
crime was committed because of bigotry.
1. Quine's Theory of Radical Translation
Quine's theory of radical translation" 6 presents the basic
problem with inferring another's intended meaning from his spoken
word. His argument suggests that it is impossible to ascertain that
speaker A and listener B derive or intend the same meaning from
the same word. Thus, Quine asserts that any manual of translation
between two languages is indeterminate.11 7 In other words, one
can never be positive that word X in language A translates to word
Yin language B. Language has a limited ability to communicate A's
meaning or sense of a word to person B who must somehow
interpret the word to get at A's meaning. The threat of radical
translation (Quine's phrase for the notion that a word's meaning
can never be ascertained with absolute confidence) is that there are
no absolute assurances that two parties are referring to the same
thing when they use the same word even if they are speaking the
same language.
To demonstrate this thesis, Quine uses his famous example of
the anthropological linguist who observes a native group in order to
learn their language: "A rabbit scurries by, thd native says 'Gavagai',
and the linguist notes down the sentence 'Rabbit' (or 'Lo, a rabbit')
as tentative translation .... 
1 1 8
How does the linguist know that the native, when he says
"gavagai," does not refer to flies which surround the rabbit, or only
.14 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
1 see infra part IV.B.
116 See WILLARD V.0. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 26-79 (1960); see also DONALD
DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 125-40 (1984); 1 DAVID
LEWIS, Radical Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 108, 108-21 (1983).
117 See QUINE, supra note 116, at 27.
118 Id. at 29.
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to white rabbits, or to rabbits jumping towards the right on Tuesday
mornings? Quine saves the Berlitz language school by noting that
the linguist could winnow out the meaning of'"gavagai" by contin-
ued observation of its use, eliminating uses which were discrepant
to the linguist's understanding. Thus, if the "stimulus meaning" of
a word does not vary from occasion to occasion, then these
"stimulus meanings may without fear of contradiction be said to do
full justice to their meanings."" 9
Quine introduces the notion of observationality and defines the
notion as a "degree of constancy of stimulus meaning from speaker
to speaker." 121 Observationality is a concept which comes in de-
grees. 121 On the extreme of high observationality, with words like
"red," changes in meaning over different contexts are not signifi-
cant. One could imagine the linguist and native coming to few
confusions about the word "red." At the other extreme, however,
consider the word "bachelor," whose meaning would be very
difficult to ascertain over numerous occasion meanings' 22 and
stimulus meanings.
Everyday life supports this argument. Say two people disagree
about the color of a shirt, one claiming that it is red, the other
claiming that it is pink. They could quickly resolve the dispute by
noting that their meanings of red differ. "Is this shirt red to you?"
B asks A. If A's answer is yes, B learns that A means "red" to
include the particular hue the shirt possesses. Try the experiment
with "bachelor," however. Say A and B disagree as to whether X is
a bachelor. At what will A and B point to understand their
respective meanings of bachelor? Bachelor has low observationality
simply because its meaning is not easily established by "gavagai"-like
experiments in the world.
Words with high observationality have meanings which are more
easily determinable through "gavagai"-like experiments. The reverse
will be true with words with low observationality. Moreover, low
observationality will produce odd and discrepant occasion sen-
tences'2 -like having some unmarried men called bachelors, but
"9 d. at 42. Stimulus meaning is a Quinean term of art referring to the disposi-
tion to dissent or assent which the linguist elicits when he points to the rabbit and
asks, "gavagai?" Id. at 34.
120 Id. at 43.
121 See id. at 42-44.
" "Occasion meaning" is another Quinean term used to describe a word's
meaning at a particular time it is used. See id.
123 "Occasion sentence" is a Quinean term which refers to sentences that "com-
1994] MOTIVE CRIMES AND OTHER MINDS 2097
not other unmarried men, like priests. 124  Words with low
observationality will have a "wide intersubjective variability of
stimulus meaning,"1 25 and their meaning will be more difficult to
ascertain. Thus, Quine presents a scale of observationality.'
26
While one can never be sure of the meaning of another speaker's
words, some words will more readily allow agreement of application.
2. Applying Quine's Radical Translation to the
Determination of Intended Meaning
Although Quine never resolves the problem of radical interpre-
tation's indeterminacy, observationality suggests that the more times
one sees a word used, the clearer its application becomes.'
27
Applying Quine's story of the linguist and the native to the problem
of intended meaning, one might surmise that the stimulus meaning
of intent is very difficult to ascertain. Unlike with rabbits, one
cannot point at anything because intents and beliefs are nonphysi-
cal. Indeed, internal mental states would have a very low observa-
tionality, and it is not clear whether one could ever have a proper
translation. Quine notes that "[i]n practice, of course, the natural
expectation that the natives will have a brief expression for 'Rabbit'
counts overwhelmingly."128  In short, we expect that a certain
word refers to a certain concept because we already have a concept
for that word. We tend to translate "gavagai" as rabbit because we
have a word "rabbit," but we do not have a word for the concept of
a "white bunny jumping to the right in midmorning."
Thus, one could claim that ascriptions of intent to other minds-
which have very low observationality-are more the imposition of
our concepts of intent rather than any response to observed
empirical data. This implies that we receive knowledge of others'
mand assent or dissent only if queried after an appropriate prompting stimulation."
Id. at 35-36.
124 Few, I assert, would call a priest a bachelor.
125 Id. at 45.
126 See id. This is admittedly an oversimplification. Quine was truly skeptical
about whether any intentional system can be determinate-of whether one can truly
tell what another really believes. See DENNErr, supra note 47, at 40 ("[lIt is always
possible in principle for rival intentional stance interpretations ... to tie for first
place, so that no further fact could settle what the intentional system in question
really believed."). Nonetheless, Quine's "gavagai" experiments do suggest how human
beings approximate each others' meanings and thus can be fruitfully applied in cases
where a speaker's meaning is obscure.
'
27 See QUINE, supra note 116, at 42.
128 Id. at 40.
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internal mental states from analogy. Due to the low observationality
of internal mental states, we export or analogize our concepts of
mental states (which we receive exclusively from our own individual,
subjective experience) onto other minds.
3. Application to a Legal Setting: Determining Meaning
The preceding discussion casts doubt on the nature of verbal
evidence to support a certain conclusion about a defendant's
intended meaning and his mental state. Consider the "water buffalo
incident" which occurred at the University of Pennsylvania in
January 1993 and dragged on throughout the school year. 129 A
student yelled "water buffalo" out of the window at a group of
African American women who were involved in a loud sorority
activity.' The shouting student, Eden Jacobowitz, was charged
with violating the university's ban on hate speech. 3 ' The question
facing the university tribunal was whether the student intended to
demean the women and inflict direct injury. 1 2 This question, in
turn, depended on what "water buffalo" meant to the speaker. The
speaker claimed that water buffalo meant, to him, "behema."a'3
Behema is the Hebrew word for water buffalo, which also means a
rude, inconsiderate individual. The Judicial Inquiry Officer, Robin
Read, thought the term referred to animals found in Africa and thus
deemed the remark racist.1
3 4
Under a Quinean paradigm, one would discover the speaker's
meaning by eliciting stimulus meanings." 5 In an ideal world one
1 See Howard Goodman, At Penn, an Appeal for Quiet Brings Speech Issue to the
Fore, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 27, 1993, at B4.
'" For a discussion of the incident, see generally Howard Goodman, At End of
Hate-Speech Hearing at Penn, No One's Allowed to Talk, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 17, 1993,
at Al.
131 See Goodman, supra note 129, at B4 ("Jacobowitz soon found himself on the
receiving end of racial harassment charges.").
"' The University of Pennsylvania defines "racial harassment" as
any verbal or symbolic behavior that.., is intended by the speaker or actor
only to inflict direct injury on the person or persons to whom the behavior
is directed; or is sufficiently abusive or demeaning that a reasonable,
disinterested observer would conclude that the behavior is so intended; or
occurs in a context such that an intent only to inflict direct injury may
reasonably be inferred.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 1992-1994, at
6.
13s Goodman, supra note 129, at B4.
134 See id. Read was mistaken, at the very least, in her zoology.
... See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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would present the speaker with numerous stimuli to determine what
"water buffalo" means. First, one would point to a group of African
American women and say "water buffalo." Next, one would point
to a group of rude, inconsiderate people and say "water buffalo."
Based on the type, number, and range of stimulus meanings
elicited, one could with some confidence determine the meaning of
"water buffalo" as meant by the speaker.
Without Quine's experiment, one simply cannot fix the meaning
of another's speech. Of course, commonly used words present few
problems of radical translation, at least for nonphilosophers. Words
on the borderline-those words that are not in common use or those
uttered by speakers of different languages 136 -require a transla-
tion. As the above example shows, racial epithets can sometimes
fall into this category.
C. David Lewis and Intended Meaning: Does Radical
Interpretation Collapse into the
Argument from Analogy?
David Lewis provides an excellent dissection of the issues of
radical translation and interpretation, which illuminates the types of
knowledge needed to make inferences about another's mind from
verbal evidence.13 7  Without Quine-like "gavagai" experiments,
Lewis points out that assumptions about other minds must be made
in order to understand language. He makes the vital point that not
only must one assume, as Quine notes, that the intended meaning
of a speaker's word is far from immediately apparent, but also that
in order to arrive at another's intended meaning, we must ascribe
our own beliefs and desires onto another person.
38
1. The Principle of Charity
Lewis calls this requirement the "Principle of Charity,"139 and
formulates it in the following way: "[T]here must exist some
common inductive method M which would lead to approximately
our present systems of belief if given our life histories of evidence,
and which would likewise lead to approximately the present system
" Interestingly, as mentioned above, Eden Jacobowitz was, in a way, using
Hebrew, a foreign language.
137 See LEWIS, supra note 116, at 108-18.
138 See id. at 112-13.
39 Id. at 113.
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of beliefs ascribed [by us to other people]." 4 ' The reason the
Principle of Charity is needed to arrive at others' meaning is simply
because, considering others simply as "physical system[s],"' we
have no access to their beliefs and desires and, therefore, without
the Principle, we cannot even begin to guess at which beliefs and
ideas another individual means his words to represent. Consider
the following example: Pierre looks at a Napoleon pastry and starts
drooling, and Pierre says "yum, yum." We can believe that "yum,
yum" means "I believe the pastry is delicieux" because the Principle
of Charity allows us to assume that if I were to look at a Napoleon
pastry and say "yum, yum," I, like Pierre, would find the pastry
delicious. In other words, there must be an inductive principle
(which Lewis calls "M"142) which will insure that both you and
Pierre would react similarly given the same physical environments.
Without this inductive principle, one would have no way of deciding
whether "yum, yum" meant "c'est delicieux" or "c'est merde."
M, the Principle of Charity, is really a sort of analogical
argument which asserts that you or I would experience the same
internal mental reactions to the same environment or external
stimuli. As such, M is open to the same problems of the analogical
argument that come dramatically to mind with the water buffalo
example. What Eden Jacobowitz meant when he said "water
buffalo" is difficult to ascertain because we are uncertain when we
infer our mental states onto another-because, in short, the
argument from analogy is limited.
2. Language, Meaning, Intended Meaning, and Intent
We return to the argument from analogy and discover that
language is not a perfect vehicle to discover the internal mental
states of others. It is the burden of the above argument that to
arrive at the meaning of others' words one must first assume, by the
argument from analogy, a degree of knowledge about other minds.
Thus, words cannot convey internal mental states dispositively, for
to understand words' meanings, one must make assumptions about
other minds. One would be quite justified, therefore, to doubt the
140 Id.
.. Id. at 108. By physical system, I take Lewis to mean that we have no direct
access to other minds and must judge their beliefs and intentions purely on their
physical behavior.
142 Id. at 113.
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use of epithets to demonstrate that the speaker harbors ethnic or
racial animus, because their meaning is often opaque.
Last, it should be remembered that even if one were to establish
as racist the meaning of a word or phrase, such as "water buffalo,"
as meant by the speaker, this would merely establish the speaker as
a racist, not that whatever crime committed subsequent to the
comment was motivated by racial animus. It would merely be
circumstantial evidence of such motivation, and it is the motivation
which laws may constitutionally punish, not the bigotry. 4 As an
evidentiary concern for hate crimes, it presents us with a consider-
able problem: how to distinguish between the bigot who uttered
epithets but was not motivated by bigotry and the bigot who was
actually motivated by bias. It seems that given the evidence poten-
tially available, such a distinction may often be impossible to make.
D. Functional Analysis
Common sense interrupts the discussion. Surely, one can
decide another's mental state from the particular circumstances and
the particular kind of act being done: people who answer doorbells
generally have the mental state of belief that there are visitors, those
who open books and sit down in easy chairs generally intend to
read, and so on. Certain acts require and entail having certain
mental functions. When a pianist plays a concerto and makes all his
entrances correctly, one can conclude that his subjective mental
state includes the knowledge both of the concerto and the place at
which the orchestra is playing.
The California Code of Evidence presumes general intent; one
is presumed "to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
act."144 This underscores the notion that the simple doing of an act
entails that the actor intend to do that act. The California Code of
Evidence, however, does not presume "specific intent."'4 5 This is
because specific intent is not necessarily part of doing a particular
act; the act could very conceivably be done with different mental
states. Thus, for prosecution for assault with intent to murder, the
"s See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993) (stating that a
defendant's abstract beliefs may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing
judge). See infra part IV.D for a discussion of the constitutional requirements of bias
motivation.




2102 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 2071
mere act itself is not dispositive of mental state, because the act
could be committed with numerous mental states.
146
The proponents of motive crimes and hate-crimes statutes
assume that given the circumstances of a particular incident, mental
state will be readable-or, at least, that is the notion behind the
"totality of the circumstances" test that is so often urged for motive
crimes. 47 As the totality of circumstances argument goes, one will
understand the function and purpose with which an act was done-
and thus the accompanying mental state-from an analysis of what
mental states a particular act usually, or perhaps necessarily, entails.
For example, one cannot imagine a soloist making a proper
entrance in a concert without having knowledge of the music as an
internal mental state. In fact, that is the traditional way intent has
been proved-by circumstantial inference from a particular situation.
Thus, John Wigmore says the problem of determining intent should
be termed "[w]hat circumstances tend probably to excite a given
emotion?"
4
The problem is that as soon as one leaves more basic acts and
more simple intents, the number of mental states one could
reasonably attribute to the actor multiplies. Thus, for simple acts-
of the type the law most often criminalizes-circumstantial evidence
is appropriate and probably accurate. People who inflict grave
bodily harm probably intended to do so. Potentially attributable
alternate mental states, such as being in a hypnotic trance while
committing the act, seem easy to eliminate in this case. As soon as
one develops more complex acts, however, certainty falls away and
one can eliminate other potentially attributable mental states far less
easily. Some types of acts can be done with numerous purposes in
mind, and simply observing the act or describing it in purely
physical terms will not reveal which of these purposes is, in fact,
controlling the actor's mind when the act is being committed. 49
141 See People v. Snyder, 104 P.2d 639, 639-640 (Cal. 1940) (holding that where an
act becomes criminal only when performed with a particular intent, that intent must
be alleged and proved).
147 See S. REP. No. 138, supra note 112, at 52.
14 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 389, at 417
(Chadbourn rev. 1979) (emphasis omitted). Wigmore identifies three types of
circumstantial inferences to show mental states. These are (1) "circumstances tending
to excite, stimulate, or bring the emotion [intent, motive] in question into play"; (2)
"outward conduct expressing and resulting from the emotion in question"; and (3)
"the prior or the subsequent existence of the emotion in question." Id. § 387, at 416.
Wigmore uses emotion interchangeably with motive, feeling, and passion. See id.
.4. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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III. WHICH MENTAL STATES DOES THE CRIMINAL LAW REQUIRE?
So far in the discussion, three inferential strategies have been
described to infer internal mental state from physical behavior: the
argument from analogy, the analysis of statements, and a functional
analysis of the usual mental states found in an act. The question
then presents itself: In which types of mental states is the criminal
law interested? The answer, in general terms, are intents; namely,
those culpable mental states which mark "the fundamental distinc-
tion we all learned as children, between things done 'on purpose'
and those that are not."
150
Although this is hardly the place to go into a discussion of
action theory and the law, I will present a basic, if not simplistic,
paradigm for the way mental states play into behavior so as to
clarify later discussion of "motive" and "intent." The paradigm
suggests that reasons explain actions, providing a rational explana-
tion of an action given a particular set of beliefs and desires.
Aristotle called such forms of explanation "practical reasoning" and
formalized it in what he called the practical syllogism:
1. X desired q; and
2. X believed that doing p would produce q; and
3. X's doingp was caused by a desire for q and the belief that
doing p would produce q.1
5
1
Thus, in a rough sense, intentional action clearly involves
this type of practical reasoning. The criminal law penalizes those
with "culpable minds," namely those who act for the wrong reasons
and therefore hold culpable beliefs and desires. Thus
1. X desires to murder Y; and
2. X believes that pointing a pistol and pulling the trigger would
produce Y's murder; and
3. X's pointing and shooting was caused by his desire for murder
and the belief that pointing and shooting would bring it about.
Therefore, the criminal law seeks the accused's mens rea-those
beliefs and desires which constitute intent and which furnish the
explanatory reasons for the accused's actions. The other minds
problem presents the difficulties in figuring out those beliefs and
desires, and this Comment has so far outlined three inferential stra-
1-0 MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 77 (1984).
151 Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
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tegies for discovering them. The following Part will discuss motives
and intents. It will demonstrate how the beliefs and desires entailed
in motive crimes make the other minds problem especially acute.
IV. FROM INTENT TO MOTIVE: FROM THOSE CLAIMS THAT ARE
REASONABLE TO MAKE ABOUT OTHER MINDS TO
THOSE WHICH ARE LESS REASONABLE
The discussion has thus progressed so that one might think,
along with Judge Posner, that intentional, mentalistic language
should be significantly reduced in the criminal law.15 2 After all,
if the argument from analogy is as limited as it is, if verbal reports
of internal mental states are indeterminate in meaning, and if
functional meaning can be arbitrary, how can one meaningfully fill
in the mentalistic terms of the Model Penal Code's general
requirements of culpability?
153
Common sense should remedy this crisis. Obviously, many of
us do know what's going on in other people's minds; in many cases,
it is not that much of a problem. The burden of this Comment is
to show that, in general, motives are far more difficult than intents
to demonstrate with certainty. In short, to use the language of Part
III, the beliefs and desires which constitute motive crimes' mens rea
are, in general, more difficult to determine than intent crimes.
Motive crimes, therefore, present greater epistemological difficulties
than do those of intent-difficulties which may make determinations
under motive laws arbitrary.
The argument will proceed in the following manner: first,
motive crimes will be distinguished from intent crimes; second, two
types of motive crimes will be discussed, using the Violence Against
Women Act and hate-crimes statutes; third, several reasons why
motive crimes present greater epistemological problems than intent
crimes will be set forth, using VAWA and hate crimes as examples.
A. Motive and Intent
Scholars and courts (including the Wisconsin Supreme Court
which struck down the hate-crimes ordinance in State v. Mitchell 54)
have made much of the distinction between motive and intent.
155
152 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
153 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
1- 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1992), vacated, 504 N.W.2d 610
(1993). See infra part IV.D. for a discussion of Mitchell.
155 See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990) ("Intent and motive should
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Professors Wayne LaFave and Austin Scott have given it a classic
formulation: "[w]hen A murders B in order to obtain B's money,
A's intent was to kill and his motive was to get the money."
56
Motive, in other words, goes to the "why" of an action while intent
goes to the "what." Or, to phrase it slightly differently, intent goes
to the means, while motive goes to the ends.
The distinction between intent and motive is, unfortunately,
often not so clear. The problem is that human action is not neatly
divided into means and ends-or whats and whys. LaFave and Scott
recognize this problem, stating that "intent relates to the means and
motive to the ends, but that where the end is the means to yet
another end, then the medial end may also be considered in terms
of intent."'5 7 They leave open the question of how to distinguish
between medial ends and "end ends." Motives can be intents and
vice versa; it is all a matter of how the action is viewed. 5 As
Douglas Husak says, "insofar as the criminal law is concerned with
past intentions, it must also be concerned with motives, since each
past intention is a motive."'5 9
The motive/intent distinction can also be criticized by claiming
that it is merely a matter of description. Examine this example
taken from a recent defense of hate-crimes legislation:
Consider the bias crime of a racially motivated assault upon an
African-American. There are two equally accurate descriptions of
this crime: one views the bias as a matter of intent; the other as
a separate matter of motive. The perpetrator of this crime could
be seen as either:
(1) possessing a mens rea of purpose (or knowing or
recklessness) with respect to the elements of assault along
with a motivation of racial bias;
(2) possessing a first-tier mens rea of purpose (or knowing
not be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers
only to the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted."). See generally Susan
Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You inJail But Can Words Increase Your Sentence?
Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333
(1991).
1'6 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw
§ 3.6(a), at 227 (1986).15 7 Id. at 320.
15s See DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAw 145 (1987) ("This use
of the means/ends distinction is problematical, for the end of one action may be the
means toward another.").
159 Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, CRIM. JUST. ETHIcS,
Winter/Spring 1989, at 3, 10.
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or recklessness) with respect to the elements of the
parallel crime of assault and a second-tier mens rea of
purpose with respect to the element of discriminatory
victim selection.'
60
The author here concludes that since the crime of racial assault can
be described equally well by intent/motivation and intent alone, the
criminal law should not put too much stock in distinguishing
between intent and motive.
161
Well, not so fast. Though some think the notion that motive is
irrelevant to criminality is a mere "clich6," 16 2 the distinction has
supporters both in philosophy and the law. For example, G.E.M.
Anscombe considered intentions as "mental causes" and did not
believe that motives qualify as mental causes: "Motives may explain
actions to us; but that is not to say they 'determine', in the sense of
causing, actions... . [Rather, t]o explain one's own actions by an
account indicating motive is to put them in a certain light.""6 3 An
intent for a particular act can be part of innumerable motives. To
use the above example, an intent to assault can be motivated by
hatred, a desire to rob, a general need for violence, or racial
animus. To assign a motive to an intent requires both a longer
story to be told about the actor's subjective mental state and
inevitably more interpretation on the jury's part-thus creating
ample room for uncertainty and inaccuracy. Because an intent is,
however, "closer to the actus reus" and has more direct causal
relationship, the intent is easier to read from the act.
In a sense, motives are not as "present" in the act. Motives draw
a wider circle, describing acts in broader terms, placing actors in
broader frameworks, and requiring more detailed and specific
knowledge of subjective mental states. The above example'16
illustrates the breadth: the second description is longer in sheer
word length. Further, "discriminatory victim selection" is a more
complicated term than "intending to assault." Discriminatory victim
selection only makes sense, to use Anscombe's phrase, "in a certain
16 Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox:
Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 720
(1993).
161 See id. at 720.
" Ralph S. Brown, Susan Gellman Has It Right, CRIM.JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall
1992, at 46, 46.
163 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 19, 21 (1969).
' See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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light."165 In order to attribute discriminatory victim selection to
the actor, you must know the race of the attacker and victim,
something about the attacker's personal history, and the history of
attitudes and interactions between the two groups. Indeed, by
speaking of acts in terms of intents, one narrows the field of
description; motive expands the field. Thus, Fletcher says, "[i]f the
actor commits larceny intentionally and voluntarily, his accountabili-
ty and culpability are complete and there is no need to inquire
further into his motives."166 In short, although intents tend to be
concerned with an actor's mental attitude towards a spatio-temporal-
ly limited event (like an assault or larceny), motives are concerned
with the broader picture-the actor's general views, his abstract
beliefs, and greater social directives.
Recall the general framework for intentional action of the
belief/desire set. Using the previously discussed descriptions of
assault, compare the results:
Intents
1. X wants to assault P; and
2. X believes that by punching P he will assault P; and
3. X's assaulting P was caused by his wanting to assault and
believing that punching P would produce an assault.
Motives
1. X wants to assault P, and X wants to assault a minority;
and
2. X believes that by punching P he will assault P and, at the
same time, assault a minority member; and
3. X's assaulting P was caused by his wanting to assault and
his wanting to assault a minority and his belief that
punching P would produce these ends.
Whatever one thinks about intents and motives, it becomes obvious
that motives involve much longer, more verbally complex belief/
desire sets; this is to be expected, for motives have a wider, broader
view. Motives require juries to look more penetratingly into
defendants' minds. Because they are "longer" and encompass more
of an actor's internal mental states, crimes of motive require courts
to do more mind reading than plain old crimes of intent. Motives,
perhaps, push the other minds problem to the point where it is
115 ANSCOMBE, supra note 163, at 21.
166 FLETCHER, supra note 32, § 6.6, at 463.
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difficult to have knowledge about other minds. That is a possibility
which Part V will examine. In the meantime, the Comment will
turn to a brief description of two motive crimes.
B. The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence
Against Women Act: What Motivates Rape?
The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA")16 7 grants victims
of gender-motivated violent crimes'6 8 the ability to lodge a federal
civil rights claim. The rationale for making violent crimes against
women a civil rights violation is that these crimes reduce victims "to
symbols of group hatred [that they] have no individual power to
change or escape. The violence not only wounds physically, it
degrades and terrorizes, instilling fear and inhibiting the lives of all
those similarly situated.')
6 9
1"7 The relevant sections of VAWA's current proposed codification read:
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that-
(1) crimes motivated by the victim's gender constitute bias crimes
in violation of the victim's right to be free from discrimination on
the basis of gender;
(7) a Federal civil rights action as specified in this section is
necessary to guarantee equal protection of the laws and to reduce
the substantial adverse effects of gender-motivated violence on
interstate commerce; ....
(c) CAUSE OF ACTION.-A person (including a person who acts under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who
commits a crime of violence motivated by gender.., shall be liable to the
party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court
may deem appropriate.
(d) DEFINMIONS.-For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender; ....
S. REP. No. 138, supra note 112, at 29-30.
"6 "Crime of violence" is thus defined:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against that person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1988).
'r9 S. REP. No. 197, supra note 112, at 43. The 1993 VAWA report states that
"'[u]ntil women as a class have the same protection offered others who are objects of
irrational, hate-motivated abuse and assault, we as a society should feel humiliated
and ashamed.'" S. REP. No. 138, supra note 112, at 49 (citation omitted).
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SenatorJoseph Biden, who first introduced VAWA several years
ago, 1 ° claims that the statute "recognizes, for the first time, a civil
rights remedy for victims of crimes 'motivated by gender.'...
Whether an attack is motivated by racial bias or ethnic bias or
gender bias, the results are the same.""' An interesting question
presents itself: Is rape enough, in itself, to constitute a civil rights
violation? Certainly numerous feminist theorists and commentators
have a ready answer of "yes." In fact, the notion that rape is a
"political act of violence and domination" is widely accepted in
feminist circles. 172  This theme has become an article of faith
among many prominent professional feminists.7 ' Feminists have
advanced the theory that rape is an act meant to perpetuate male
domination.'74 The feminist claim seems difficult to maintain in
light of a growing body of empirical evidence, coming mostly from
researchers of a sociobiological bent, that rape has sexual and
reproductive motivations.17 5 Alternative explanations, including
those incorporating an economic analysis, have also been suggest-
ed. 1
7 6
170 VAWA was first introduced in 1990 as S. 2754, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
171 Joseph R. Biden, Domestic Violence: A Crime, Not a Quarrel, TRIAL, June 1993,
at 56, 59.
17" Craig T. Palmer, Twelve Reasons Why Rape Is Not Sexually Motivated: A Skeptical
Examination, 25J. OF SEX RESEARCH 512, 513 (1988).
175 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE LJ. 1281, 1302 (1991) ("Rape is an act of dominance over women that works
systemically to maintain a gender-stratified society in which women occupy a disadvan-
taged status as the appropriate victims and targets of sexual aggression." (citation
omitted)).
174 See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 15 (1975) (stating that rape
"is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men
keep all women in a state of fear"); LORENNE M.G. CLARK & DEBRAJ. LEWIS, RAPE:
THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY 27 (1977) (supporting the feminist view "that rape
is simply the ultimate weapon which men use to exercise power over women");
ALSON M. JAGGER, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 262 (1988) ("Radical
feminists see rape as a political act which is oppressive on many levels.").
17' The thesis states that rape is an alternate reproductive strategy used by low-
status males who cannot find mates using the other two reproductive strategies,
honest courtship and seduction-deception. See Randy Thornhill & Nancy W.
Thornhill, Human Rape: An Evolutionay Analysis, 4 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 137,
138 (1983) (citing W.M. Shields & L.M. Shields, Forcible Rape: An Evolutionary
Perspective, 4 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 115 (1983)).
176 The feminist theories for the causation of rape compete on a crowded field.
According to Judge Posner, "[c]ontrary to a view held by many feminists, rape
appears to be primarily a substitute for consensual sexual intercourse rather than a
manifestation of male hostility toward women or a method of establishing or
maintaining male domination." RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 384 (1982)
(footnotes omitted). Posner suggests a rational economic actor analysis in which the
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Yet before the motivation claim can be answered, there is a
genuine question as to whether VAWA has any conscious mens rea
requirement at all. If there is a mens rea requirement, there is a
further question as to what it might be. The language frustrates in
its vagueness, and the legislative history is tangled, so any conclu-
sions about VAWA's mens rea must be tentative and, according to
one supporter of the bill, can be fully developed only by the
courts. 177 Nonetheless, potential mens reas will be discussed so as
to show in Part V why these mens rea requirements are much more
difficult to establish than those of traditional intent crimes.
What does it mean that a rape was "motivated by gender"?
What mental state must accompany the act of rape so that it is
considered so motivated? As stated above, VAWA, in its most
recent form, defines a "crime of violence motivated by gender" as
a "crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis
of gender; and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the
victim's gender."17 This language suggests two main directions
for looking at the mens rea requirement: the animus requirement,
as defined in the current codifications of the civil rights stat-
utes, t79 and the intent requirement under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.18°
C. The Animus Requirement: What Does It Mean
and How Could It Be Proved?
The legislative history points to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and related
civil rights law as well as Title VII in order to show motivation.
1 8 1
incidence of rape is related to the scarcity and availability of sex. See id. at 385-86.
Supporters of VAWA, however, seem conspicuously hostile to the notion that
rape may have a sexual component. For instance, at least one writer has used
Posner's views as an example of the persistent prevalence of sexism and sexual
stereotyping on the federal bench. See W.H. Hallock, Note, The Violence Against
Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 601 n.162 (1993).
177 See generally The Civil Rights Title of the Violence Against Women Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciay, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Civil Rights Title Hearings]
(statement of James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
" H.R. 3355, supra note 20, § 3402(d).
M See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
0 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
' See S. REP. No. 138, supra note 112, at 51-53. Like the statutes on which it is
modeled, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), this
section of VAWA reaches gender-based discrimination by private persons and by
persons acting under color of state law. See H.R. 3355, supra note 20, § 3402(c).
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Under the case law, the animus standard has been developed in the
racial context and, to a degree, in the gender context.
1. Animus Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
According to its most prominent judicial interpretation, 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) requires that "[t]he language requiring intent to
deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities,
means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus." 8 2  The question
presents itself: Is the rape act sufficient, in itself, to demonstrate
such animus? Supporters of VAWA often claim that the act of rape
itself constitutes a civil rights violation. In the following Section,
this claim will be examined.
This specific intent requirement of § 1985(3) has been reaf-
firmed in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,"8 3 in which the
Supreme Court held Operation Rescue's efforts to obstruct abortion
clinics did not constitute "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" against women."' Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
noted that in order to avoid the "constitutional shoals that would lie
in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort
law,"8 5 there must be a specific animus requirement-in this case,
there must have been an animus against women. Further, Scalia
noted that this intent requirement could be inferred if the object of
its animus were so irrational that it could be seen only as a mask for
another animus: "A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews."
186
He ruled, however, that "opposition to voluntary abortion cannot
possibly be considered such an irrational surrogate for opposition
to .. .women."
i8 7
Under this formulation, the intent requirement of VAWA would
be very specific and would look something like this:
1. X wants to have sexual intercourse with P, and X hates P
because she is a member of a certain class, namely women.
2. X believes that by raping P he will have sexual intercourse with
P and, at the same time, express his hatred for a class.
162 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971).
183 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
' Id. at 759 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102).
"8 Id. (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102).
1
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3. Xs raping P was caused by his wanting sexual intercourse, his
hatred of women as a class, and his belief that raping P would
result in sexual intercourse and an expression of his hatred.
Thus, the animus requires a degree of "mind reading" much greater
than for the crime of rape.
2. VAWA's Title VII Connection: Is There an
Intent Requirement?
The Title VII approach is in complete opposition to the animus
requirement, yet the legislative history clearly points to Title VII as
providing the method of proof of motivation which VAWA would
use. The legislative history states that "[t]he phraseology 'motivated
by,' 'because of,' 'on the basis of,' or 'based on' sex or gender is
used interchangeably in the case law discussions of Title VII. This
body of case law will provide substantial guidance to the trier of fact
in assessing whether the requisite discrimination was present."' 8
Title VII case law has established that knowledge of any mental
state is not required to show discriminatory motive.'8 9 Of the two
broad categories of Title VII discrimination, disparate impact and
disparate treatment, 90 only the latter requires a showing of
intent."'I Under disparate impact, however, the plaintiff must
show that a particular employment practice produces a disparate
impact pattern in hiring; the employer's defense is a showing of
business necessity. 9 2 If an employer has a practice which a court
188 S. REP. No. 197, supra note 112, at 50-51. The 1993 VAWA report notes that
the "definition of gender-motivation is based on Title VII." S. REP. No. 138, supra
note 112, at 52.
189 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) ("The Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation.... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." (emphasis
omitted)); McKinney v. Doles, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[A]ny ...
unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but
for the sex of the employee may. . . comprise an illegal condition of employment
under Title VII.").
19 See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 310-13 (2d ed. 1988).
191 Moreover, under disparate treatment, the prima facie case can be made without
reference to intent. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. y. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
(stating the four-part prima facie case of racial discrimination).
1 See David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, at 1, 55 (ALI-ABA Video Law Review Study Materials,
Feb. 13, 1992). Under current law, business necessity requires a showing "'that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
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fails to deem related to a business function, that employer is liable
under Title VII-regardless of his intent or lack of intent to
discriminate. The legislative history, in fact, offers disparate impact
evidence as proof of gender-based motivation in rape.1 93  The
Senate Report states that "the victim's lawyers would prove... that
the attacker did not kidnap and rape men, but had a long history of
attacking women."194 In other words, if a man only rapes women,
he violates VAWA, but if he rapes men and women-and is therefore
an equal opportunity rapist-he is exempt.'9 5
D. Hate Crimes: Mitchell, Motive, Intent, and
Knowing Other Minds
Much of the recent debate on hate crimes and penalty-enhance-
ment statutes has revolved around the constitutional issues of
whether such laws violate First Amendment guarantees of free
speech and thought or are void on grounds of vagueness or
overbreadth' 96  In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 9 7 a unanimous decision
affirmed the constitutionality of hate-crimes statutes. The argument
was clear: citing legal scholars LaFave and Scott,' Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that culpable motives often play a key role in
sentencing. 9 9 Moreover, the argument that hate-crimes statutes
should not punish motive is not compelling, because motive plays
a role in other laws that have been upheld."' In short, the state
is free to punish crimes differently depending on the motive if it
feels that the same crime, if differently motivated, differs in its
perceived harms.
business necessity.'" Id. (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. IV 1992)).
193 See S. REP. No. 197, supra note 112, at 50-51.
194 Id. at 50.
"' See Wendy R. Willis, Comment, The Gun Is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and
Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEo. L.J. 2197, 2224 (1992).
19 See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 155, at 354-79.
197 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
198 See LAFAvE & ScoT-r, supra note 156, § 3.6(b), at 324 ("Motives are
most relevant when the trial judge sets the defendant's sentence, and it is not,
uncommon for a defendant to receive a minimum sentence because he was
acting with good motives, or a rather high sentence because of his bad
motives.").
"9 See Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199.
2o" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against an employee or potential employee "because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin").
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court, on the other hand, found the
statute unconstitutional because it criminalized thought. Drawing
heavily on Professor Susan Gellman's article, the court concluded
that the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute was overbroad,
violating protected First Amendment rights. 20 ' Accepting the
LaFavian distinction between intent and motive, the court conclud-
ed that the statute punished motive and therefore violated the First
Amendment: "[The Wisconsin hate-crimes statute gives] an
additional punishment for the defendant's motive in selecting the
victim. The punishment of the defendant's bigoted motive by the
hate-crimes statute directly implicates and encroaches upon First
Amendment rights."
20 2
Gellman has used this distinction to assert that "[u]nlike purpose
or intent, motive cannot be a criminal offense or an element of an
offense." 2 3 Making motive a crime actually criminalizes thought,
not action, and thus violates the First Amendment guarantee of
individuals' freedom of thought.0 4
Interestingly, the court noticed the evidentiary problem of
showing motive:
The conduct of "selecting" is not akin to the conduct of assaulting,
burglarizing, murdering and other criminal conduct. It cannot be
objectively established. Rather, an examination of the intentional
"selection" of a victim necessarily requires a subjective examina-
tion of the actor's motive or reason for singling out the particular
person against whom he or she commits a crime.
205
Present in the court's thinking is the notion that there is something
different about motives-or, in particular, the type of complex
intents which hate crimes entail. The next Part will examine this
possibility.
201 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 157-58 (1992).
202 See id. at 166.
203 Gellman, supra note 155, at 364.
20" See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding a New Hampshire state
statute invalid because it could not require citizens to display state motto containing
an ideological message without violating the First Amendment); see also Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[A]t the heart of the First
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and
that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his conscience rather than
coerced by the State.").
205 Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d at 166.
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V. MOTIVE CRIMES AND INTENT CRIMES: DO THE FORMER
PRESENT AN INTRACTABLE OTHER MINDS PROBLEM?
An obvious argument presents itself: simply because motive
crimes require more knowledge about other minds than do intent
crimes, motive crimes are suspect. This argument has a good deal
of punch. Justifying knowledge about other minds is deeply
problematic, so the criminal law should use mentalistic language
sparingly. While intent crimes seem to use mentalistic terms in
ways few would find difficult to accept, motive crimes cross the
other minds Rubicon where knowledge is more problematic: few
would dispute that one who attacks another with a knife intends to
kill him, but for what motive this act is committed (jealousy, anger,
unresolved childhood sexual tension, racial animus, generally violent
temperament) is a far more difficult and complicated question. Yet
beyond this general argument, there are many more specific reasons
why motive crimes present greater problems than intent crimes. To
bring out the differences, I will draw on the previous Section's
discussion of penalty-enhancement crimes for hate crimes and
VAWA.
A. The Argument from Analogy Fails for Motive
Crimes' Complex Motivational States
The first difference has to do with the way criminal statutes are
usually constructed. Take a hate crime and a typical concomitant
crime-assault committed because of racial animus. The mens rea
required for assault is "purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another."2 6 Using the argument from analogy,
this is generally not too difficult to determine. As children (and
sometimes as adults), most of us have gotten into physical fights; as
adults we observe what types of instruments and physical move-
ments can cause bodily injury-so that one can conclude that if one
uses a brick to smash another's head, one probably intends to cause
bodily injury. The argument from analogy works well because we
all share the similar experiences of living in the world, of having
bodies, and of knowing and experiencing the types of intents we
have when we hit or punch or pummel. As human beings we
generally share the necessary experience so that the other minds
problem does not present an enormous obstacle in determining
206 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(a).
1994] 2115
2116 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 2071
assault's mens rea. As a general rule, it seems fair that for crimes
like assault, which center around simple acts or intentional basic
physical movements as the mens rea requirement, the argument
from analogy works quite well.
Consider, however, the other minds problem of whether a
defendant's action was motivated by racial animus. The argument
from analogy works less well here. While many believe that racial
prejudice is so endemic to our society that all Americans experience
prejudice, few act in violence on racial motivations. Few know what
it is like to act violently from racial animus; thus, it becomes
impossible to analogize one's own mental states onto defendants
charged with such animus.
B. The Covariant Relationship Between Crime and Animus
A second problem is that of the covariant relationship between
racial animus and general violent, criminal nature. Notice that the
hate-crimes laws require that the criminal act be motivated by racial
animus. Otherwise, hate-crimes laws would merely punish racists
who happen to commit crimes, thus running afoul of the First
Amendment." 7 Hate-crimes statutes require courts to separate
out a defendant's general political or social views and to concentrate
on the act itself.
This distinction is essential; without it the laws would penalize
thoughts. The problem is that such a separation is difficult, to say
the least, and considering the other minds problem, it may often be
impossible. How can one distinguish between, on one hand, the
racist who happens to assault people and expressed himself as a
racist before an attack and, on the other hand, a racist whose attack
was actually motivated by racial animus? Far from being academic,
this distinction keeps hate crimes from being thought crimes.
Moreover, whenever courts make mistakes because of their
essentially limited ability to infer mental states (and because of the
unverifiable nature of intents, no one will ever be able to tell if
mistakes have been made), then hate crimes will be thought crimes.
207 Lawrence, supra note 160, at 698 (the "commission of a bias crime may be
proscribed and constitutes a crime.., which... may be punished. The same cannot
be said of racist speech.")
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1. Animus as a "But-For" Cause
The model of the practical syllogism for intentional or purposive
action requires that the actor believe and desire certain things about
the act.2°8 Certainly, there are other causes for the act other than
the actor's intention. Say the crime is theft. A white supremacist
attends a neo-Nazi rally. Afterwards he drinks a bit and then
decides to rob someone. His victim happens to be African Ameri-
can. Following this line of thought, racial animus is a but-for cause
for a particular act; had the attacker not had racial thoughts, the
attack would not have happened. Nonetheless, the practical
syllogism which the actor went through at the time of the attack had
nothing to do with race.
Consider slightly altered Mitchell 9 facts. Say that the attackers
were violent after seeing a film and perhaps even harbored racist
feelings. The young men saw a white youth and pursued him. Say
further that the chase is long and exhausting, and the attackers
would have given up except for one who urges them on, telling
them that they would be unathletic sissies if they allowed the victim
to outrun them. The attackers finally catch up and beat the victim.
Flushed with anger at the victim's flight, they have forgotten their
racial animus and are only concerned with showing their stubborn
victim that they are not to be bested. When the young men finally
get around to beating their victim, they are motivated by anger,
annoyance, and the need to save face among their comrades. Race
does not play into the practical syllogism which accompanies the
actual assault.
If this is the case, then the young men are not motivated by
racial factors in their assault. The practical syllogisms in the
attackers' minds which controlled the criminal action of assault had
nothing to do with racial animus, for their belief/desire set did not
contain racial animus-even though racial animus was a but-for cause
of the attack.
If the criminal law punishes mens rea only when it "accom-
pan[ies] the act that produces or threatens the harm,"210 then the
213 See supra part III.
21 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). The defendant in Mitchell
watched the film Mississippi Burning, which focuses on racial conflict, shortly before
attacking his victim. See id. at 2196; see also supra part IV.D (discussing Mitchell in for
detail).
211 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEVEN SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 217 (1989 5th ed.).
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hypothetical Mitchell attackers' racial animus but-for cause cannot be
punished. As a practical matter, it may often be impossible to
distinguish those cases in which racial animus functions as a but-for
cause from cases in which it acted as the motivating mental factor
that accompanied the outlawed harm. If this is the case, then hate
crimes merge with thought crimes.
2. The Incompleteness of Verbal Evidence
and Circumstantial Evidence
The second problem is that verbal evidence can establish only
that one is a bigot, not that bigotry served as the motivating factor
in a hate crime. Even if an actor uttered racist speech shortly
before the crime, it establishes him only as a racist and sheds little
light on whether the act itself was racially motivated. Thus, even if
one were able to ascertain the intended meaning of an epithet,2 '
it hardly proves that racist motivations played into the practical
syllogism which controlled the criminal act. Although epithets are
highly suggestive, if not dispositive, of general viewpoint and
approach (perhaps even a but-for motive), these viewpoints, in
themselves, cannot be criminal, for such a criminalization would be
tantamount to criminalizing thought. The criminal act, itself, must
be motivated by such animus. Such fine, yet essential distinctions
may be lost on the jury. The problem with motive crimes, there-
fore, is that verbal evidence-one of the key types of evidence used
for their proof-can show only general attitude;21 2 it cannot show
whether the act itself was so motivated.
C. The Verbal Sophistication of Motive: The Specificity
of the Animus Requirement
Wittgenstein states that "[i]f a lion could talk, we could not
understand him." 13 In this vein, he writes:
A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also
believe his master will come the day after to-morrow?-And what
211 Part II.B.3, supra, shows that this is no easy task.
212 See James B. Jacobs, Should Hate Be a Crime?, 113 PUB. INTEREST 3, 8 (1993)
("Examinations [often used in hate-crimes trials] seem more likely to turn hate crime
trials into character tests of the most pernicious kind and to widen social divisions.").
21s LUDWIG WrTTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 223 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1974).
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can he not do here?-How do I do it?-How am I supposed to
answer this?
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have
mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of
hope are modes of this complicated form of life.214
I think that Wittgenstein is stating, in his characteristic way, that
certain behaviors and actions-like hoping-are only possible to
those creatures who possess the verbal sophistication to make them
possible. Thus, dogs cannot hope, and lions cannot speak in a
humanly comprehensible language because such activities involve a
verbal complexity which dogs and lions do not have; the act, in a
sense, is defined by the verbal complexity.
If we accept the notion that practical syllogisms are, in some
way, the controlling factors over our behavior, then an actor must
have a degree of verbal sophistication in his intents in order to
intend certain intents. Just as a dog cannot hope, a factory owner
who never heard of Marx cannot intend to produce an alienated
consciousness among the proletariat (even though he may do
precisely that and may understand he is doing so after explanation
from a Marxist intellectual). In short, an actor's beliefs and desires
must be sufficiently complex in order to intend these sophisticated
acts.
If one recalls the comparison of the belief/desire sets for
motivation and intention, one remembers that the motive's belief/
desire set was both longer and more complicated. 15 Indeed,
because motives have a more general, wider framework, their
description is more complicated. Intents, which concentrate on
smaller slices of action, are simpler and based on simpler acts.
The question then presents itself. Do motive crimes specify
such complicated motives that actors cannot fairly be held to have
them? I think this question comes to the fore in VAWA, which
requires "an animus based on the victim's gender."216 It is not at
all clear what that animus would mean; following Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Center,211 it would mean something like this:
1. X desires to have sexual intercourse with Y and thus to
humiliate women as a group; and
214 Id. at 174.
215 See supra part IV.A.
216 H.R. 3355, supra note 20, § 3402(d)(1).
217 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Bray.
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2. X believes that raping Y will allow him to have sexual
intercourse with Y and humiliate women as a group; and
3. X's raping Y was caused by his desire to have sexual inter-
course and to humiliate women as a group and his belief
that raping Y would accomplish these ends.
It seems at least possible that not all rapists go through this process.
It seems probable that their motivations and thought process are
not that well-articulated. It seems possible that rapists intend to
commit the physical act of rape and even harbor inchoate hostility
towards women, but the practical syllogism associated with their
criminal act does not even approach the verbal complexity of the
animus requirement. The conscious, well-defined animus may not
be present-even though, if, like the factory owner, they might be
made to understand rape in the terms of animus after some time in
therapy. Thus, crimes of motivation run the risk of criminalizing
intents which the actor does not have but which others believe, as
a theoretical matter, are suggested in the act. The legislative history
and intellectual framework suggests that the act of rape itself would
be demonstrative of antiwomen class animus.2 1 If this approach is
taken, VAWA may punish actors for acting on motivations which
they do not, in fact, possess.
D. Problems of the Unconscious Motive
Another problem with motive crimes is that many believe that
some motives and mental processes are unconscious. 219 VAWA,
for instance, potentially penalizes unconscious motivation. 220 This
presents a tremendous epistemological dilemma-how does the
Court determine motives which are unknown to the actor himself?.
Freudian analysis attempts to do just that-with limited success.
As Professor Stephen Morse notes, "the role of psychodynamic
218 In fact, some of the earlier versions of VAWA specifically enumerated rape as
a crime of violence motivated by gender and eliminated the need for proof of gender
motivation for these crimes. "[T]he term 'crime of violence motivated by gender'
means any crime of violence, as defined in this section, including rape." H.R. 5468,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(d)(2) (1990).
219 See SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHo-ANALYSIS 353 (James
Strachey trans. & ed., 1966) ("[P]sychological research of the present time ... seeks
to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself
with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind.").
20 Although the 1993 VAWA has an animus requirement, there is no guarantee
that courts will require a conscious animus. Just as Title VII does not require
conscious intent, neither may VAWA, which is modeled after Title VII.
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psychology in general is not sufficiently scientifically verified for the
law to accept it as relevant in the criminal process. Speculations
based on psychodynamic psychology, judged as scientific causal
accounts of behavior, are not 'informed' but idle."221 Indeed, if
crimes of motive transform the witness stand into the analysand's
couch and the jurors into analysts, that, in itself, may be good
reason not to criminalize motive. Speculations into hidden
motivations unknown to the actor are, well, speculative, and
probably do not meet the normative standards required for a fair
trial. Using unconscious motives, the other minds problem simply
becomes the "mind" problem-not only do others have limited
access to the defendant's mind, but the defendant, himself, has
limited access to his own mind.
There is also an ethical concern for not using unconscious drives
to establish culpability. If we view culpability as acting for the
wrong reasons, then it is a serious question whether one can be held
morally responsible for reasons which are, at least at the time of the
event, unconscious. It certainly does not square with notions of
fairness for a court to tell a defendant, "At the time you committed
the act, you had these beliefs, desires, and consequent intent-even
though you did not know you had them." Yet, that is precisely what
crimes of motive invite courts to do.
E. The Revenge of the Other Minds Problem?
In 1980, New York City responded to a spate of hate crimes by
establishing the Bias Crime Unit to "'monitor and investigate acts
committed against a person, group, or place because of race,
religion, or ethnicity."'222 The New York Police Department's
("NYPD") definition of hate crime requires that the act be motivated
by a particular bias.
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Interestingly, the Bias Unit's pronouncement "on whether any
particular crime is bias-motivated itself has become a volatile
political issue which could exacerbate or even set off conflict." 224
"' Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and
the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 1017-18 (1982).
'James B. Jacobs, Rethinking the War Against Hate Crimes: A New York City
Perspective, CRIM.JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 55, 55.
"The NYPD defines a bias incident as "[a]ny offense or unlawful act that is
motivated in whole or in part by a person's, group's or place's identification with a
particular: race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation." Id. at 60 n.3 (citing BIAS
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION UNIT, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T 8 (1991)).
" Id. at 57; see also William K. Rashbaum & David Kocieniewski, Early Release:
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In late 1992, in the wake of numerous complaints, the NYPD
instituted a new procedure in which an officer "will not 'deem' an
incident bias-related. Rather the officer will declare it a 'possible
bias incident' and turn it over to the NYPD's Bias Unit which will
make a determination. The unit's work will be reviewed quarterly
by an NYPD panel."
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The NYPD's history places the difference between bias crimes
and other crimes in high-relief. When a thief steals or a murderer
kills, there is no administrative structure to determine whether the
officer who first reports the incident "deemed" it correctly. Yet, in
the bias-crime area, the officer who first appears on the scene is not
trusted to determine whether the crime occurred. Bias crimes may
exist in a different epistemological plane where certainty is much
rarer; the proof is in the practice.
CONCLUSION: WHAT IS AT STAKE?
Why should one care about VAWA or hate-crimes legislation?
Why should it make a difference whether rapists or other criminals
receive extra sentencing or additional civil penalties? After all, most
people rightly feel little sympathy for either rapists or bigoted
criminals. The integrity of the judicial system, however, requires
that it neither be arbitrary nor impinge on freedom of thought.
The burden of this Comment has been to show that VAWA and
hate-crimes statutes presume knowledge is possible in areas in which
such knowledge is virtually always suspect and in which the threat
of punishing thought is always present. These laws feed a legal
vanity that human motivations are transparent when, in fact, they
are opaque. When courts make decisions based on inherently
speculative knowledge, their decisions will inevitably be seen as
arbitrary. Laws which require judges and juries to make such
uncertain determinations can only hurt the judicial process,
especially when errors lead to the punishment of thought.
Since the time of Dinah,22' all civilized societies have con-
demned rape, and American society-especially considering its
tortured history of racial relations-must condemn racially-inspired
DA Admits Error in Freeing Suspect, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 23, 1993, at 3 (describing the
possible involvement of the Bias Unit in prosecuting an insane woman who pushed
people in front of subways and who made an antiwhite remark).
Editorial, The Bias Tag. Use It Carefully, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 23, 1992, at 44.
26 See Genesis 34:7 ("[H]e had wrought folly in Israel in lying with Jacob's
daughter; which thing ought not to be done.").
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crimes. Nonetheless, VAWA and hate-crimes legislation are not the
vehicles to achieve these ends. Because they present jurors and
judges with motivation's evidentiary vacuum, they invite courts to
impose their own personal, perhaps often political, views onto the
inner workings of defendants' minds. Because the evidence used
for determining motive is so problematic, judges and juries may
simply pick between conflicting views of society and humanity
instead of seriously examining the facts before them, because the
facts before them, as the Comment shows, are perhaps always
insufficient to determine motive. These laws are, in a sense, politics-
by-other-means, inviting judges and jurors to impose their own
world views and not examine the facts of the case. To paraphrase
Karl Kraus,22 1 these laws claim to be the cure-but are, in fact, the
disease.
227 See PAUL HOFMANN, THE VIENNESE: SPLENDOR, TWILIGHT, AND EXILE 130 ("Of
the many aphorisms that Karl Kraus crafted, probably the most famous is his
assertion that 'psychoanalysis is the mental disease whose therapy it believes itself to
be.'.).
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